Volume 586 — United States Reports

Held: in light of the parties' agreement that the Iowa statute covered some "outside" behavior ( i.e., ordinary vehicles), that the statute did not count as a generic burglary statute.

constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 , 337, 26 S.Ct. 282 , 50 L.Ed. 499 .

constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 , 337, 26 S.Ct. 282 , 50 L.Ed. 499 . 1 Of course, whether Congress wished to pull back the throttle with regard to robbery across the whole ACCA is less certain.

Petitioner New Prime Inc. is an interstate trucking company, and re- spondent Dominic Oliveira is one of its drivers. Held: A court should determine whether a §1 exclusion applies before ordering arbitration. A court’s authority to compel arbitration under the Act does not extend to all private contracts, no matter how em- phatically they may express a preference for arbitration.

Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court considered whether the excessive fines clause of the Constitution's Eighth Amendment applies to state and local governments.

Respondent Troy Lambert filed a class action in federal court alleging that petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation’s marketing of a dietary supplement ran afoul of California consumer-protection law. Held: however, that Rule 23(f)’s deadline should be tolled under the circumstances because Lambert had “acted diligently.” On the mer- its, the court reversed the decertification order. Held: Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 3–10.

In 1945, Congress passed the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), which, among other things, grants international organi- zations the “same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by… Held: The IOIA affords international organizations the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under the FSIA. Pp. 6–15.

Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, barring cruel and unusual punishment. The case deals with whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing a person for a crime they do not remember.

Respondent Michael Loos sued petitioner BNSF Railway Company un- der the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for injuries he re- ceived while working at BNSF’s railyard. Held: A railroad’s payment to an employee for working time lost due to an on-the-job injury is taxable “compensation” under the RRTA. Pp. 2–14. (a) In 1937, Congress created a self-sustaining retirement benefits system for railroad workers.

Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 586 U.S. 347 (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855 preempts the state law which the State purported to be able to tax fuel purchased by a tribal corporation for sale to tribal members. This was a 5-4 plurality decision, with Justice Breyer's opinion being joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Ginsburg, penned a concurring opinion. There were dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh.

Federal immigration law empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision, and generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain… Held: The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded. 831 F. 3d 1193 and 667 Fed. Appx. 966 , reversed and remanded.

Law firm McCarthy & Holthus LLP was hired to carry out a nonjudicial foreclosure on a Colorado home owned by petitioner Dennis Obdus- key. Held: A business engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure pro- ceedings is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, except for the limited purpose of §1692f(6). Pp. 6–14. (a) The FDCPA regulates “‘debt collector[s].’” §1692a(6). Relevant here, the definition of debt collector has two parts.