¶1*425Siegfried Hesse (argued), of Dodge, Reyes, Brorby, Randall, Kahn & Driscoll, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
¶2Donnie Hoover (argued), Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee.
¶3Before MERRILL and TANG, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR,* District Judge.
¶6Before 1963, the compensation of retired military personnel was calculated with reference to the pay received by those on active duty; when the active duty pay scales increased or decreased, retirement pay was correspondingly recomputed. In 1963, Congress changed the statute so that adjustment of retirement compensation was tied to the cost of living index, rather than to the active duty pay scales. Appellants are military personnel who retired before the 1963 statutory changes went into effect. They brought suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), claiming that they had suffered a monetary loss under the 1963 computation system and that the 1963 Act denies them their property without due process in violation of the fifth amendment. The district court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim, finding that appellants did not have any vested right which was denied by the government. On appeal, appellants renew their contentions made below that they have a vested right to recompute their retirement pay in accordance with the law in effect at the time they retired and that the 1963 Act retroactively deprived them of that vested right.
¶7As to vested rights, the distinction between earned military pay and that to be earned in the future has long been recognized. The Supreme Court has recently restated it: .
“No one disputes that Congress may prospectively reduce the pay of members of the Armed Forces, even if that reduction deprived members of benefits they had expected to be able to earn. Cf. Bell v. U. S. [366 U.S. 393, 81 S.Ct. 1230, L.Ed.2d 365 (1961)]; U. S. v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 60 S.Ct. 1034, 84 L.Ed. 1356 (1940). It is quite a different matter, however, for Congress to deprive a service member of pay due for services already performed, but still owing.”
¶8United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 879, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 2159, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977).
¶9Appellants contend first that the United States is contractually obliged to compensate them under the old law by the terms of their enlistment contract. United States v. Larionoff, supra,rejects this proposition. It states:
“Both the Government and respondents recognize that ‘[a] soldier’s entitlement to *426pay is dependent upon statutory right,’ Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 401, 81 S.Ct. 1230, 1235, 6 L.Ed.2d 365 (1961), and that accordingly the rights of the affected service members must be determined by reference to the statutes and regulations governing the [compensation], rather than to ordinary contract principles.”
¶10431 U.S. at 869, 97 S.Ct. at 2154. To the same effect is Andrews v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 561 (1966). The Supreme Court, in Larionoff, continues in footnote 7 at page 869, 97 S.Ct. at page 2154:
“Indeed, this is implicitly recognized in the contracts executed by the named respondents, which state that they agree to extend their enlistments ‘in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue to me during the continuances of my service,’ rather than stating any fixed compensation.”
¶11The language there quoted by the Court is similar to language in the enlistment contracts upon which appellants rely.
¶12We conclude that appellants have no contract right to have their compensation computed under the old law.
¶13Appellants further contend that retirement pay is, in the language of Larionoff, “pay due for services already performed but still owing”; that it is deferred compensation for past services.
¶14This proceeds upon the premise that with military retirement all compensible service owing to the government ceases. This has been established as a false premise since at least 1881.
¶15In United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 26 L.Ed. 985 (1881), the Court considered a statute that increased the pay of military officers by 10 percent for every 5 years of service. The question presented was whether appellee, a retired captain, was entitled to this pay increase. The Court ruled that Congress had distinguished between officers “wholly retired” whose retirement compensation was fixed at a lump sum, and officers “retired from active service” whose continuing compensation was fixed by statute at “75 per centum of the pay of the rank upon which they are retired.” As to the latter, the Court held that “while not required to perform full service, they are part of the army, and may be assigned to such duty as the laws and regulations permit.” 105 U.S. at 245, 26 L.Ed. 985. Accordingly it was held that officers retired from active service were entitled to the increase in pay.
¶16The Court of Claims, considering the nature of retirement pay, has arrived at the same result. In Lemly v. United States, 75 F.Supp. 248, 249, 109 Ct.Cl. 760, 763 (1948), the court stated:
“Retirement pay … is a continuation of active pay on a reduced basis. Even though an officer is retired from active duty and is receiving retirement pay, he is still subject to call to active duty as long as his physical condition will permit. He is still an officer in the service of his country even though on the retired list.”
¶17Further, the Court of Claims has reached the same result as to the precise problem before us. Appellants’ contention that retirement pay is deferred compensation for past services was considered and expressly rejected in Abbott v. United States, 200 Ct.Cl. 384 (1973).1
¶18Appellants contend that all these holdings must be re-examined in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48, supra.
¶19That case deals with the military re-enlistment bonus. For many years a bonus has been used as an incentive to re-enlistment, being a sum added to the regular *427duty pay drawn after re-enlistment. With the impact of technology on military service a new incentive was felt necessary to induce re-enlistment of those who had acquired special skills important to the service. Congress authorized the armed services to provide such incentive by regulation. Pursuant to statute, certain skills were enumerated by regulation as entitled to Variable Re-enlistment Bonus (VRB) in addition to the Regular Re-enlistment Bonus (RRB) theretofore paid. By regulation it was provided that those enlisted men with such skills who re-enlisted or by contract extended the period of enlistment would be entitled to award of the VRB. It was provided, however, that the crucial date in determining entitlement to the award was the date of termination of the original enlistment and commencement of the new, or extended, enlistment. The serviceman must on that date be possessed of a special skill entitling him to the VRB.
¶20Appellees in Larionoff, serving their original term of enlistment in the Navy, engaged in study to acquire a special skill enumerated among those entitling the possessor to a VRB. They entered into contracts extending their enlistments. Before their original terms of service had expired the Navy amended its list of qualifying skills to exclude the skills acquired by them, feeling that there was no longer any special need for such skills. Appellees sued, contending that this retroactively deprived them of a vested right to the VRB. The court of appeals agreed and the Supreme Court affirmed. Appellants here contend that if a right to the VRB there became vested at the time the contract extending enlistment was signed, their right to retirement pay vested at the time of retirement, the vesting carrying with it the method of computation then applying.
¶21We cannot agree that Larionoff compels that result. There are several points of difference.2 We rely on but one. In Larionoff the Court concluded that the VRB was earned when the serviceman had committed himself to an extension of his service. It was not a raise in pay to be earned as service was performed; it was a bonus, fully earned upon commitment. Here, as we have held, retirement pay does not differ from active duty pay in its character as pay for continuing military service. Statutory compensation of this sort for mil*428itary service can, under Larionoff be prospectively altered without offending the due process clause.
¶22Judgment affirmed.