Jones v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
42 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently March 2008 · most notably Rubio v. State (1980), Moore v. State (1985)
42 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Albrecht v. State · Jones v. State · Ford v. State · Moss v. State · Ransom v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"It is well established that an accused may not be tried for some collateral crime or for being a criminal generally. Hines v. State, 571 S.W.2d 322 [(Tex.Cr.App.)]; Cameron v. State, 530 S.W.2d 841 [(Tex. Cr.App.)]; Halliburton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 216 [(Tex.Cr.App.)]. One of the exceptions we have recognized to this general prohibition against the use of extraneous offenses, is that such evidence is admissible to refute a defensive theory raised by the accused. Buckner v. State, 571 S.W.2d 519 [(Tex.Cr.App.)]; Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 [(Tex.Cr. App.)]. When the appellant raises the defensive theory of alibi, he places his identity in issue. Jones v. State, 587 S.W.2d 115 [(Tex.Cr.App.)]. Once the issue of identity has been raised, evidence of an extraneous offense is admissible to prove identity only if there is some distinguishing characteristic common to both the extraneous offense and the offense for which the accused is on trial. Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 [(Tex.Cr.App.)]; Jones v. State, supra; Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 [(Tex.Cr.App.)]."”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Dickey v. State“"... if it is established that the accused committed an extraneous offense, and that there is some distinguishing characteristic common both to it and the offense for which the accused is on trial, then an inference may be drawn that the accused was the person who committed the primary offense. On the other hand, if there is no common distinguishing characteristic, then the evidence is offered only to show that the accused has once committed a crime, and is therefore likely to have committed the principal offense. This is not permitted. "The common distinguishing characteristic may be the proximity in time and place of the extraneous offense to the offense for which the accused is being tried. Or, the common element may be the mode of commission of the crimes, or the mode of dress of the perpetrator, or any other element which marks both crimes as having been committed by the same person."”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Dickey v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.