Nastu v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

61 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “... It is well established that a search conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable and that the warrant requirement is subject only to a few well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). One of these exceptions arises, under certain circumstances, when there is probable cause to search an automobile. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1924). This exception exists in part because the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto are most often unforeseeable and the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car can be readily moved. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). But this exception is not absolute. Chambers and Carroll teach us that the expectation of privacy, and hence the protection afforded it, is lower in automobiles than it is in houses or offices. But automobiles are still protected by the Fourth Amendment and there must be probable cause to search and exigent circumstances which make acquisition of a warrant impracticable in order to search without one. Scott v. State, 531 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Cr.App.); Reed v. State, 522 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.Cr. App.).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Delgado v. State · Marcopoulos, Andreas

2. ““It is well established that a search conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable and that the warrant requirement is subject only to a few well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). * * * * * He “However, ‘[o]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent’ Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.). But before consent can be effective, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was given freely and voluntarily. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.Cr.App.); Kolb v. State, supra. “ ‘Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.’ Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex.Cr.App.). Schneckloth v. Busta-monte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Martin v. State

3. “"It is the right of every citizen to be secure in his home from warrantless searches in all but a few instances. However, `[o]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.' Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr. App.). But before consent can be effective, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was given freely and voluntarily. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.Cr. App.); Kolb v. State, supra. "`Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.' Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex.Cr.App.). " Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. May v. State