59 Cal. 2d 97 - Casey v. Proctor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 federal appellate · 6 district · 152 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 211 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “On the one hand, the policy of the law is to encourage out-of-court settlements. To further this policy the parties to a dispute should be encouraged to negotiate settlements and to enter into releases. In the absence of unfair conduct on the part of the releasee, the law should extend its protection to the stability of the transaction by holding the parties to the express terms of the release. If later discovered injuries may be asserted, no release would be final and free from attack until the statute of limitations has run. [Citations omitted.] On the other hand, if the releaser is bound by the literal terms of the release, it has been recognized that he is left to suffer personal injuries without compensation, while the releasee, who usually is an insurer, has received a windfall in avoiding liability for a risk it has been paid to assume. [Citation omitted.] Furthermore, the long-term effects of damage to human tissue are extremely difficult to anticipate and the opportunity for error is great. [Citation omitted.] Finally, stress has been laid upon the fact that as between the releaser and the releasee, a large disparity of bargaining power is presented; usually the release is a prepared form drafted by experts and presented in a take it or leave it manner, while the releaser is ordinarily an individual without any knowledge of legal documents or assistance from legal counsel. [Citations omitted.] The fact that these considerations warrant special treatment of releases f”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Heath v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company · 23 Utah 2d 155 - Reynolds v. Merrill

2. ““Under the majority rule, however, a release may not ipso facto be avoided upon the ground of later discovered injuries. The essence of the rule is that the wording of the release is not conclusive; it is a question of fact whether the parties to the release actually intended to discharge such liability. * * * Whether a release bars an action for later discovered personal injuries is a question of fact and depends upon whether it was ‘knowingly’ made. (Citations)” 378 P.2d 588 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 84 Wash. 2d 140 - Finch v. Carlton · Ranta v. Rake

3. “[P]ermit a releaser under proper circumstances to avoid a release, regardless of its terms, where it appears that unknown injuries existed at the time it was executed. ( Doud v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 259 Minn. 341 [ 107 N.W.2d 521 ]; Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App.2d 1 [ 165 N.E.2d 733 ]; McGuirk v. Ross, 53 Del. 141 [ 166 A.2d 429 ]; Crane Co. v. Newman (Ind. App.) 37 N.E.2d 732 ; Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328 [ 57 N.W.2d 381 ]; Reed v. Harvey, 253 Iowa 10 [ 110 N.W.2d 442 ]; Parker v. United Tank Truck Rental, Inc., 21 Misc.2d 246 [ 290 N.Y.S.2d 250 ]; Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Buss (D.Kan. 1960), 188 F. Supp. 895 [Kansas law]; Graham v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (9th Cir.1949) 176 F.2d 819 [F.E.L.A. action]. See Note 71 A.L.R.2d 82 , 88; 6 Corbin, Contracts (1962) § 1292, pp. 182-183; 5 Williston, Contracts (rev.ed. 1937) § 1551, pp. 4347-4349. Contra O'Donnel v. Langdon, 170 Ohio St. 528 [ 166 N.E.2d 756 ]; Kennedy v. Bateman, 217 Ga. 458 [ 123 S.E.2d 656 ]; Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Oregon, supra, (Ore.) 366 P.2d 527 .)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Heath v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company · 10 Wash. App. 32 - Finch v. Carlton