Wendt v. Wendt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

98 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 98 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) At the time of entering a decree . . . dissolving a marriage . . . the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. . . . (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party . . . shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Friezo v. Friezo · 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 11666 - Mendez v. Itt Hartford, No. Cv97-0480336 S (Aug. 13, 2001)

2. “The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. ... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. ... Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ... Therefore, to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 170 Conn. App. 368 - Emerick v. Emerick

3. “The standard to be employed when determining whether a judge should recuse herself or himself pursuant to canon 3 (c) [of the Code of Judicial Conduct] is well established. The standard ... is an objective one [meant to assess] whether [the judge] can be fair and impartial in hearing the case. ... Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for the judge's disqualification. Thus, an impropriety or the appearance of impropriety ... that would reasonably lead one to question the judge's impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within the scope of the general standard. ... The question is not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply whether another, not knowing whether or not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question [the judge's] ... impartiality, on the basis of all of the circumstances.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 170 Conn. App. 368 - Emerick v. Emerick