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← 59 F.3d 668 - Goffman v. Gross

Goffman v. Gross’s Empirical Analysis

59 F.3d 668 · 1995

Citation profile

55
cited by 55 later decisions
February 2021
most recently cited

23 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently February 2021 · most notably Giles v. Kearney (2009), Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp. (1999)

23 federal appellate ·

2601995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · United States v. Raddatz · Helling v. McKinney · Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler · Ingraham v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[r]ather the district court has discretion to 'accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].' " Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). 7 Here, the district court made the necessary de novo review of Graham's objections. First, it explicitly rejected Graham's objections concerning his appointed counsel. Then, it ruled on Graham's objections to the magistrate judge's conclusions regarding the 1990 incidents as evinced by the fact that the district court ruled on grounds not even mentioned in the Report (i.e. that Graham had no liberty interest in being free from segregation after five days). The fact that the district court ruled without the benefit of the trial transcript is irrelevant, as is the district court's silence regarding the magistrate judge's mistake about the dates of Graham's segregation, because it ruled as a matter of law that Graham did not have a protectible liberty interest. The Report accurately reported the substance of Graham's claim, if not the date; thus the district court had the information necessary to rule on this claim. 8 Graham next argues that the district court erroneously concluded he had no liberty interest in being free from segregation after five days under Sandin because Sandin left open the possibility of a prisoner having a liberty interest in being free from punishment that "will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “In reviewing the decision of the District Court, our responsibility is not to substitute findings we could have made had we been the fact-finding tribunal; our sole function is to review the record to determine whether the findings of the District Court were clearly erroneous, i.e., whether we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” It is the responsibility of an appellate court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact-finder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.