59 Ill. App. 3d 706 - Roper v. Markle’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
83 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 89 later decisions — most recently September 2011 · most notably 85 Ill. 2d 161 - Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146 - Witherell v. Weimer (1981)
83 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 22 Ill. 2d 432 - Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. · 43 Ill. 2d 54 - Rozny v. Marnul · 45 Ill. 2d 418 - Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. · 61 Ill. 2d 129 - Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. · 56 Ill. 2d 548 - Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 89 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““* * * where the injury manifests itself at one time but there is no reason to know that the injury was caused by another until a later time, the later time starts the statute’s running since it reflects the date on which the claimant knew or should have known of the ‘injury.’ Such an interpretation is consistent with the purpose of statutes of limitations. Their purpose is not to shield a wrongdoer but rather to discourage the presentation of stale claims and to encourage diligence in the bringing of actions. [Citation.] Until such time as a plaintiff knew or should have known that a condition, seemingly innocent in causation, was perhaps the result of another’s act which may have been negligent, he has had no opportunity to discover that a cause of action exists [citation] or to be less than diligent in pursuing it in court. It would be both unrealistic and unfair to bar a cause of action before such time. In addition, it would not serve to further the purpose of the statute of limitations.” 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 713-14 .”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The situation presented in Lipsey is similar to that in traumatic injury and foreign substances malpractice cases. In traumatic injury cases, that is, where the damage is caused by external violence (see Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968), ‘Trauma’, ‘Traumatic’), it has been recognized that the time when a plaintiff knows or should have known of his right to sue is when he is injured. (E.g., Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418 , 261 N.E.2d 305 ; Berry v. G. D. Searle Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548 , 309 N.E.2d 550 .) Foreign substance medical malpractice cases are similar to trauma cases in that the time when a plaintiff discovers the injury— the substance left behind — is obviously also the time when he knows or should have known both that he has been injured and that the injury is the result of another’s negligence. That in some types of cases an awareness of a physical problem also carries with it awareness of its wrongful causation, does not dictate a triggering of the limitations period in all malpractice cases when one becomes aware solely of a physical problem. We note that a different rule has been recognized as applicable when the injury involved is of a type which does not immediately put one on notice of its origination by negligent means.” 59 Ill. App. 3d 706, 711 .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““In view of the court’s phrasing of the issue and avowed concern that negligently injured plaintiff’s actions not be barred before they have an opportunity to realize that one exists, it is our conclusion that any support which Lipsey s phrase, ‘learns of the injury’ lends to the interpretation advanced by defendant that knowledge of the existence of a physical problem is the triggering event in all cases for the running of the limitations period was unintentional. The phrase was intended to express that the statute begins to run when there is a concurrence of the actual or constructive knowledge of both the physical problem and the possibility that someone is at fault for its existence. The current statutory language of section 21.1 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 22.1) ” was patterned after Lipsey and must be construed as expressing this same concept.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.