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← 59 MDAPP 625 - Tolen v. State

Tolen v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
October 2001
most recently cited

4 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Agurs · Giglio v. United States · California v. Trombetta · Moore v. Illinois

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The heart of the Brady decision was that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196[-1197]. In explicating Brady, Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-795 , 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2567-2568 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1972), pointed out the three distinct components, all of which are necessary to the finding of a due process violation: “The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence. These are the standards by which the prosecution’s conduct ... is to be measured.” [Emphasis added.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affect ed the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” It is also required that the evidence in question be material. Generally speaking, this requires that the evidence be directly exculpatory and not of mere utility for impeachment purposes. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 469 , 212 A.2d 101 (1965), vacated on other grounds, 386 U.S. 66 , 87 S.Ct. 793 , 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967): “Not only must the evidence withheld be admissible and useful, but it must be such, if it had been offered in evidence, as would be capable of clearing or tending to clear the accused of guilt—i.e., it must be exculpatory.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.