59 So. 2d 718 - Smith v. Parker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Judge Janvier of the Orleans Court of Appeal in Gross v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra (La.App. 1946, 25 So.2d [837] 840) had under consideration the question of who should be considered the aggressor in an affray out of which arose a claim for workmen’s compensation. He reached the conclusion that the same rule of law in tort cases should control in a compensation case since the fundamental reason for the rule in both types of cases is the same, saying: “ ‘The reason is that one who uses words or actions which it may be expected will bring about an attempt at retaliation has only himself to blame, if as a result of the attempt at retaliation he, himself, is injured.’ “After a complete and careful analysis of Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject, he concluded the true rule to be: “ ‘We think, after a consideration of all of these cases, that the Louisiana rule is that provocative words may be pointed to as justification for an assault provided those words were such that under the circumstances it should have been assumed that physical retaliation would be attempted. “ ‘The views expressed by us in. Randall v. Ridgley, La.App., 185 So. 632 and in Bacas v. Laswell, La.App., 22 So.2d 591 , are consistent with this conclusion.’ “The ruling in Gross v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., La.App., 25 So. 2d 837 , has been referred to with approval in Jenkins v. Cities Service Refining Corporation, La.App., 44 So.2d 719 and Conley v. Travelers Insurance Co., La.App., 53 S”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hopper v. Ross · Hall v. White

2. ““ ‘In our opinion, the record clearly indicates that the plaintiff was the aggressor. The testimony preponderates to that effect. It may be that defendant was in an excitable state of mind when he entered plaintiff’s room and that he was determined to put him out, perhaps by force if necessary. Whatever his state of mind might have been, however there is no indication of belligerent or aggressive action until plaintiff applied the epithet to defendant’s wife. Perhaps the defendant believed that the raising of the plaintiff’s arm was an indication that plaintiff intended to strike him, and, if so, would be justified as a matter of self-defense in striking first, but we do not deem it essential to exonerate a defendant in an action for damages, that there should have been a belligerent gesture or a blow. It is sufficient, in our opinion, that the plaintiff should have been the aggressor and his aggression may be shown by threats, insults, or abuses, as well as by blows and hostile attitudes.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 101 So. 2d 740 - Wells v. Perkins

3. “It is the duty of the courts, whether trial or appellate, to see that justice is done between the litigants and where the court believes the verdict is unauthorized and unjust, a new trial should be granted.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 306 So. 2d 355 - Miller v. Chicago Insurance Company