Hillyer v. Hillyer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Federal law authorizes state courts to treat the “disposable retired pay [of a service member] ... either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse,” 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (c)(1), thus allowing division of such retirement benefits as marital property upon the dissolution of a marriage. However, “disposable retired pay” does not include amounts deducted from that pay “as a result of a waiver of retired pay ... in order to receive compensation under ... title 38 [disability] pay.” 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (a)(4)(B). In order to receive disability pay, a former service member must waive a corresponding portion of his or her retirement pay. 38 U.S.C. § 5305 . Disability pay is exempt from federal, state and local taxation, and this exemption provides an incentive for a former service member to make the waiver which otherwise would have no economic impact. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 583-84 , 109 S.Ct. 2023, 2026 , 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989). At the time the case before us was argued, the law was settled that state courts cannot treat disability pay as marital property subject to division upon divorce. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594-95 , 109 S.Ct. at 2032 (state court could not treat a portion of husband’s total retirement pay which was disability pay as marital property in its division of property at the time of divorce).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Oakes v. Oakes

2. “[W]hen an MDA divides military retirement benefits, the non-military spouse has a vested interest in his or her portion of those benefits as of the date of the court’s decree. That vested interest cannot thereafter be unilaterally diminished by an act of the military spouse. Such an act constitutes an impermissible modification of a division of. marital property, and a violation of the court decree incorporating the MDA. In so holding, we are undeterred by the . United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 , 109 S.Ct. 2023 , 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989). Mansell held that the USFSPA “does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has. been waived to receive veterans’ - disability benefits.” The' trial court’s decree did not divide Mr. Johnson’s disability benefits in violation of Mansell .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Selitsch v. Selitsch

3. “whether a post-divorce waiver of [military] retirement pay in exchange for a corresponding amount of [military] disability pay could reduce a former spouse’s previous award, as marital property, of a portion of the military retirement pay.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Oakes v. Oakes