Fraser v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “2. After the answer is filed, the trial judge shall determine whether the allegations in the motion can be resolved on the face of the record, in which event an evidentiary hearing is not required. A hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 , 114 S.Ct. 703 , 126 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994); Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967). The trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the record refuting them. Drake v. United States, 439 F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir.1971).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Prescott v. Commonwealth · McGaha v. Commonwealth

2. “(1) A needy person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, on suspicion of having committed, or who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled: (a) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled; and (b) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation including investigation and other preparation. The courts in which the defendant is tried shall waive all costs.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Jones v. Bailey · Maynes v. Commonwealth

3. “Like the right to trial by jury and the right of confrontation, the constitutional right to counsel is a matter of procedural due process, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), not substantive criminal law. The responsibility for determining when and whether counsel must be appointed for a criminal defendant in Kentucky is a function of the judicial department, not the legislature. Ky. Const. § 116 ; see RCr 3.05(2). To its credit, the General Assembly has created and funded the DPA, and nothing except legislative parameters precludes that office from providing legal services to indigent defendants or movants even when not constitutionally required. We conclude, therefore, that RCr 11.42(5) establishes when a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent movant and that KRS 31.110(2)(c) establishes when the DPA may provide legal services even without judicial appointment.... Since the statute is broader than the rule, we can conceive of no situation where the judge would appoint counsel for an indigent RCr 11.42 movant who would be statutorily ineligible for representation by the DPA.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. Bailey