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59 T.C. 412

Berenson v. Commissioner

United States Tax Court

Decided December 18, 1972

United States Tax Court · decided 1972-12-18

Held, a transaction pursuant to which petitioners purported to sell a ladies' sportswear business to the Temple Beth Ami, a religious organization as defined… Held: a transaction pursuant to which petitioners purported to sell a ladies' sportswear business to the Temple Beth Ami, a religious organization as defined in sec. 501(c)(3) and exempt from the tax imposed by sec. 511(a), did not constitute the sale or exchange of a capital asset within the meaning of sec. 1222(3).

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently July 1983

4 federal appellate ·

Relies on Goldstein v. Commissioner · Champayne v. Commissioner · Commissioner v. Brown

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decisions will be entered under Rule 50 · Decided 1972-12-18

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Fay, J.,

¶1dissenting: I agree with the substance of Judge Hall’s dissent. I can see no distinction between Clay Brown and the instant case, and would conclude that a sale has occurred and that petitioners are entitled to capital gain or capital loss treatment. However, assuming that the majority is correct in its conclusion that the purchase price is excessive, I cannot agree that all amounts received by petitioners should be taxed as ordinary income. Petitioners have technically disposed of their entire interest in Kitro and Marilyn. The fact that petitioners might potentially recover their proprietary interest due to an ultimate default by the buyer does not negate the existence of a present sale. See Commissioner v. Brown, 325 F.2d 313, 316 (C.A. 9, 1963). Accordingly, I believe that petitioners are entitled to section 1222(3) or section 1222(4) treatment as to that portion of the purchase price which is not deemed to be excessive. In this context, there is analogous authority for characterizing only the “excessive” portion of the purchase price as ordinary income. See Roy J. Champagne, 26 T.C. 634 (1956); see also Goldstein v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 562 (C.A. 9, 1962), affirming a Memorandum Opinion of this Court.

DreNNEN, J., agrees with this dissent.
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