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59 Tex. 266

Marshall v. Heard

Texas Supreme Court

Decided April 17, 1883

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1883-04-17

Tried below before the Hon. Joseph Bledsoe. • Appellant brought this suit against J. S. Heard and Emerson, to recover damages on account of personal injuries received from a fall caused by a defective passage way leading from the second story of one building to the second story of another. Heard owned a two-story business house, and the Emersons owned a like house near to but not adjoining it.

Cited in Anderson (1889)’s definition of “Negotiate”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1883-04-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently February 1974

10 state decisions

401883189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Watts, J. Com. Apr. —

¶1It appeal's from the allegations of appellant’s petition and amendments that he was not on the passage way at the invitation, either expressed or implied, of the appellees, or either of them ; but that he was .there of his own accord to see a tenant occupying one of the rooms in the second story of the storehouse of the Heards. These rooms upon the second floor wore rented to different persons as bed rooms and offices, while the Heards occupied the first story as a store for the sale of merchandise.

¶2Nor does it appear from the allegations of the petition and amendments that the defects in the passage way existed at the time the rooms in the second story of the houses were leased. There is no allegation to the effect that the appellees had contracted with their tenants occupying the rooms in the second story of the'building to keep this passage way or the leased premises in repair. •

¶3At common law the occupant, and not the owner, is bound, as to the public, to keep the premises in such repair that they may be safely visited by the public. And the occupant is prima facie liable to third persons for damages accruing to them from defects in the leased premises. Thompson on Negligence, vol. 1, page 317 and note 5. And it is well settled that to give the party injured a right- of action for damages arising from defects in rented premises against the owner, he must show that such defects existed at the time the premises were leased. Staple v. Spring, 10 Mass., 72; Durant v. Palmer, 29.N. J. Law, 544; Irvine v. Wood, 51 N. Y., 228.

¶4It is said in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 503, p. 578, “ The liability of the landlord, however, exists only in favor of persons who stand strictly upon the rights as strangers. Those who claim upon the ground that they were invited into a dangerous place must seek their remedy against the person who invited them. If they are the guests of the tenant, he, and not the landlord, is the *268person from whom they must seek redress for injuries caused by defects in the premises.”

¶5We conclude that the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to appellant’s petition and in dismissing the case.

¶6Therefore the judgment ought to be affirmed.

¶7Affirmed.

¶8[Opinion approved April 17, 1883.]

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