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← 590 F.3d 1082 - Mattos v. Agarano

Mattos v. Agarano’s Empirical Analysis

590 F.3d 1082 · 2010

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
1
states following
December 2017
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 6 district · 1 state decisions

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from Hawaii District Court)

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Graham v. Connor · Pearson v. Callahan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[bjefore August 23, 2006, when the confrontation occurred, neither our circuit nor the Supreme Court had decided an excessive force case involving the use of a Taser; in fact, only the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleven Circuits even addressed such cases. [Citations.] In all three cases, the courts held that the use of a Taser was constitutionally permissible. We note, however, that the Eleventh Circuit has recently rejected qualified immunity for officers who used a Taser to shock a man (who appeared mentally unstable) eight to twelve times before making any attempt to arrest him. [Citation.] The court found that although the initial use of the Taser may have been justified, the officers’ repeated use of the Taser was unreasonable and excessive under the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] More recently, in Bryan v. McPherson [ ], we rejected qualified immunity for an officer who used a Taser on a driver during a traffic stop for a seatbelt infraction____ We determined that even though the driver’s behavior was bizarre, it posed no threat to the officer and did not indicate that the driver was attempting to flee. We denied the officer qualified immunity, holding that his use of force was excessive and unreasonable. ... this is simply not a case in which the officers’ conduct was so “patently violative” of Jayzel Mattos’s constitutional rights “that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts that the action was unconstitutional.” [Citation.] The officers used the Taser ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The severity of Bryan’s purported offenses provide little, if any, basis for Officer McPherson’s use of physical force. It is undisputed that Bryan’s initial crime was a mere traffic infraction— failing to wear a seat belt-punishable by a fine.... Officer McPherson also claims that he reasonably believed Bryan had committed three misdemeanors — resisting a police officer, failure to comply with a lawful order, and using or being under the influence of any controlled substance — and that these constitute serious and dangerous criminal activity. We disagree with Officer McPherson’s assessment. While the commission of a misdemeanor is not to be taken lightly, it militates against finding the force used to effect an arrest reasonable where the suspect was also nonviolent and posed no threat to the safety of the officers or others. None of the offenses for which Bryan was cited in inherently dangerous or violent, and as already discussed, Bryan posed little to no safety threat. Therefore, there was no substantial government interest in using significant force to effect Bryan’s arrest for these misdemeanor violations that even the State of California has determined are minor.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “contact with Aikala appears to have been incidental and due mainly to the cramped quarters in which the Mattoses and the officers found themselves rather than to any intention on Jayzel’s part to interfere with the officers. Additionally, however, we must take into account Troy’s actions. He was belligerent and appeared to be intoxicated. As explained by the 911 call, Troy’s conduct that evening was a threat to Jayzel, and in his intoxicated condition, Troy posed a threat to the officers as well. Thus, Jayzel herself may have posed little threat, but any interference she caused only heightened the danger Troy represented. As the district court found, Jayzel’s actions ‘exacerbated an already tense, and rapidly escalating situation.’ On balance then, Jayzel’s actions were not a serious crime ... but carried the potential for a far more serious crime-assault on an officer.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.