590 F. Supp. 345 - Gingles v. Edmisten’s Empirical Analysis
1984
Citation profile
23 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 82 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2015 · most notably Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), Shaw v. Hunt (1996)
23 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 2284 · 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) · 42 U.S.C. § 1973C (§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) · 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866)
Relies on Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. · Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority · Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education · Gomillion v. Lightfoot · City of Mobile v. Bolden
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity of discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by over or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.... whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group_ whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice o”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[a]t the effective voting majority level it is possible to say with substantial assurance that to submerge or fracture such an aggregation in a racially polarized voting situation effectively deprives it of the presumptive capability to elect, solely by its group voting strength, representatives “of its choice.” [Citations omitted] The raw power of such an aggregation “to elect” provides a clear measure of its voting strength, hence a fair and workable standard by which to measure dilution of that strength. Short of that level, there is no such principled basis for gauging voting strength, hence dilution of that strength____ We are doubtful that either the Supreme Court in developing the dilution concept in constitutional voting rights litigation, or the congress in embodying it in amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act intended an application open-ended as to voter group size. There must obviously be some size (as well as dispersion) limits on those aggregations by voters to whom the concept can properly be applied. We do not readily perceive the limit short of the effective voting majority level that can rationally be drawn and applied.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.