Guilmette v. Howes’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Guilmette did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, as required by Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3). Our decision in Munson v. Kapture, 384 F.3d 310 (6th Cir.2004) requires the conclusion that the Michigan courts enforced Rule 6.508(D)(3) in this case and thus that Guilmette’s claim is procedurally defaulted. In Munson, as in the present case, the petitioner did not raise certain claims on direct appeal. 384 F.3d at 312-13 . In both cases, the petitioner then raised the claims in a state trial court on collateral review, and the state trial court denied the claims on the merits. Id. at 313 . Then in both cases, the state appellate and state supreme courts each denied leave to appeal in brief orders, stating that the petitioner had “failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).” Id. In Munson, we held that Rule 6.508(D) constituted an adequate and independent state ground and thus held the claims to be procedurally barred. No relevant fact distinguishes Munson from the present case, and thus Guilmette’s claim is similarly procedurally defaulted. This conclusion is supported by five of this court’s other cases, ... all of which hold that habeas claims were procedurally defaulted in situations materially in distinguishable from the present case. See Alexander v. Smith, 311 Fed.Appx. 875 (6th Cir.2009) ...; Spencer v. Booker, 254 Fed.Appx. 520 (6th Cir.2007) ...; McCray v. Metrish, 232 Fed.Appx. 469 (6th Cir.2007) ..”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Guilmette v. Howes

2. “Although M.C.R. 6.508(D)(1), (2), and (3) list specific procedural grounds for denying a defendant relief from judgment, these procedural grounds are not the exclusive grounds for which a court may deny relief pursuant to M.C.R. 6.508(D). A court may deny relief from judgment under 6.508(D)(4) for the substantive, i.e. non-procedural, reason that the defendant simply failed to meet his burden of “establishing entitlement to the relief requested.” As such, the Michigan courts’ bare citation to M.C.R. 6.508(D) in orders denying Guilmette leave to appeal does not demonstrate that the courts denied him leave to appeal on the basis of a procedural default, much less on the procedural ground described in M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3), which the warden urges on this Court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Guilmette v. Howes

3. “Guilmette has therefore failed to establish cause and prejudice for his procedural default of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and thus he is barred from raising that issue on habeas review.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Guilmette v. Howes