Commonwealth v. Dickson’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
80 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 81 later decisions — most recently December 2024 · most notably Commonwealth v. McCoy (2009), Commonwealth v. Thompson (2009)
80 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey · Johnson v. COM., PA. BD. OF PROB. & PAR. · Commonwealth v. Wright · Commonwealth v. Tilghman · Commonwealth v. Tarver
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In interpreting a statute, we must ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. See 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(a). When statutory language is clear and free from all ambiguity, it generally furnishes the best indication of legislative intent; we must not disregard the statutory language under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(b); Bowser v. Blom, 569 Pa. 609 , 807 A.2d 830, 835 (2002). Accordingly, areviewing court should resort to other considerations to determine legislative intent only when the words of the statute are not explicit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, Department of Corrections, 566 Pa. 161 , 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (2001). Finally, while minding our other principles of statutory construction, we must construe all penal provisions strictly in favor of defendants’ liberty interests. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1); cf. Commonwealth v. Wooten, 519 Pa. 45 , 545 A.2d 876, 879 (1988) (‘ [Wjhere an ambiguity exists in the language employed by the legislature in a penal statute, it should be interpreted in a light most favorable to the criminally accused.’). But see id. at 880 (‘while strict construction of penal statutes is required, however, courts are not required to give words of a criminal statute their narrowest meaning or disregard evident legislative intent.’).””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“we must construe all penal provisions strictly in favor of defendants' liberty interests”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“(a) Mandatory sentence. — Except as provided under section 9716 (relating to two or more mandatory minimum sentences applicable), any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence as defined in section 9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses), shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm or a replica of a firearm, whether or not the firearm or replica was loaded or functional, that placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Such persons shall not be eligible for parole, probation, work release or furlough.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.