591 So. 2d 550 - Tomlin v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘[U]nder the accomplice liability doctrine, a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of the capital offense of double murder only if he had the particularized intent that both victims be killed. In addition, “[t]o affirm a finding of a ‘particularized intent to kill’ the jury must be properly charged on the intent to kill issue.” ’”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Doss v. State · 72 So. 3d 712 - Mark Dwyatt Brown v. State of Alabama.

2. “"In 1899, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence of a codefendant's conviction was not admissible in the trial of his fellow accused. See Kirby v. United States , 174 U.S. 47 , 19 S.Ct. 574 , 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899). This is still the prevailing view. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1016 , and cases cited therein. " 'Where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same criminal offense which is in its nature several, or are separately indicted for such offense or for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstances, and are tried separately, the fact that one defendant has pleaded guilty or has been convicted is, as a general rule, inadmissible as against the other, since competent and satisfactory evidence against one person charged with an offense is not necessarily so against another person charged with the same offense, and since each person charged with the commission of an offense must be tried upon evidence legally tending to show guilt or innocence.' "48 A.L.R.2d at 1017. There are exceptions. 'Where the common-law distinction between a principal and an abettor has not been abolished, the conviction or plea of guilty of a principal is admissible against one being tried separately as an abettor, since the principal's guilt is a prerequisite to prove the guilt of the accused.' 48 A.L.R.2d at 1017, n. 1. Furthermore, evidence of a codefendant's conviction may be admissible for purposes of impeachment when the codefendant testifies at trial. However, the cou”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lewis v. State · 611 So. 2d 1202 - Hale v. State

3. “"Now, what specifically must the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty? There is not a whole lot to explain to you as to the elements that must be proved of this offense as set out in this indictment, as it goes to you for your consideration, for the language of this statute which I have read to you which, again, is murder or capital murder when two or more human beings are intentionally killed by one or a series of acts. And, I will state, you will note that the Act says the killing must have been intentionally done by the Defendant. That is, the Defendant must have intentionally killed the victims as opposed to accidentally or unintentionally. That is an intent to do something, do it because the person intended to do it, intends the results. That is, the death of his victims. You, lady and gentlemen of the jury, determine the intent from all the surrounding facts and circumstances in this case. Intent is a mental element or operation. There is no X-ray machine to look into someone's mind. Again, look to all the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case to determine if that specific intent is present in this particular case. If it is not, then your verdict would be not guilty." TR. 820-21 (emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Daniels v. State