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← 592 F.2d 283 - Gully v. Kunzman

Gully v. Kunzman’s Empirical Analysis

592 F.2d 283 · 1979

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
4
states following
December 2010
most recently cited

30 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently December 2010 · most notably Harpster v. Ohio (1997), Robinson v. Wade (1982)

30 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

37019791980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Younger v. Harris · North Carolina v. Pearce · Gregg v. Georgia · Burks v. United States · Furman v. Georgia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Although it has long been established that there is power in federal courts to consider on habeas corpus the merits of a constitutional defense to a state criminal charge in advance of a final judgment of conviction, Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 , 6 S.Ct. 734 , 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), considerations of federalism counsel strongly against exercising the power except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-91 , 93 S.Ct. 1123 , 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). Before we may intervene, we must find under the federal habeas corpus statute that the applicant has exhausted state remedies, or that there is ‘an absence of available State corrective process’, or ‘circumstances rendering such process ineffective. ’ 28 U.S.C. 2254(b) (1976). (emphasis added).”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[Defendant] argues that the State should be barred from retrying him because its own misconduct led to the reversal of his first conviction. Even accepting that characterization of the trial error which caused the appellate reversal, it would not affect the Spate’s right to retry him____ His attempt to analogize his situation to cases where retrial has followed a mistrial provoked by prosecutorial misconduct is unavailing. In such cases, retrial is disapproved principally because the misconduct resulting in a mistrial has deprived the defendant of “[the] valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” [Defendant’s] first trial proceeded all the way to verdict, and, consequently, he fully enjoyed that right.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"We do not think this analysis farfetched, since, under the new scheme, a defendant convicted of a capital offense may not be sentenced to death except upon a finding, `beyond a reasonable doubt,' of certain statutorily-prescribed `aggravating factors.' These `factors' might be conceived of as elements of the `greater' crimes of `capital murder/armed robbery' rather than simply as guides for the exercise of the sentencing authority's discretion to fix an approximate punishment for one convicted of `simple' willful murder and armed robbery."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.