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← 592 F.3d 386 - Palmer v. Hendricks

Palmer v. Hendricks’s Empirical Analysis

592 F.3d 386 · 2010

Citation profile

51
cited by 51 later decisions
4
states following
September 2025
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Townsend v. Sain · Brecht v. Abrahamson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[E]ven if the factual allegations in the habeas petition are sufficient to make out a prima facie claim for habeas relief, a district court may decline to convene an evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are 'contravened by the existing record.' "). In considering whether to hold a hearing, we have suggested that district courts "focus on whether a new evidentiary hearing would be meaningful, in that a new hearing would have the potential to advance the petitioner's claim.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “that because the state courts did not decide the prejudice issue on the merits, AEDPA's deferential standards do not apply to our resolution of the prejudice question”). In Wiggins, the Supreme Court did not defer to the state court’s order in assessing the second prong of the petitioner’s Strickland claim because”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.