Kiobel v. Millson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 4 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. In re Hulley Enters., Ltd. · 707 F. Supp. 2d 980 - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Schwan's Home Service

2. “We think that the terms dispositive and nondispositive as used in Rule 72 must be construed in harmony with the classifications limned in section 636(b)(1). This does not mean, of course, that dispositive motions are those excepted motions specifically enumerated in section 636(b)(1)(A), and no others. Rather, that enumeration informs the classification of other motions as dispositive or nondispositive. Motions for sanctions premised on alleged discovery violations are not specifically excepted under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) and, in general, they are not of the same genre as the enumerated motions. We hold, therefore, that such motions ordinarily should be classified as nondispositive. Withal, we caution that a departure from this general rule may be necessary in those instances in which a magistrate judge aspires to impose a sanction that fully disposes of a claim or defense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Cleversafe, Inc. v. Amplidata, Inc.

3. “Q]ust as prior to the 2000 amendments, Congress’s express withholding of the contempt powers from magistrate judges could support an strong argument that Congress intended also to withhold the power to sanction, the grant of contempt powers to magistrate judges in 2000 now powerfully supports the conclusion that Congress intended to confer sanctioning power. It is an a fortiori case. The power to impose a criminal conviction and a sentence of imprisonment is very substantially more awesome than the power to impose a noncriminal sanction. If Congress conferred on magistrate judges the power to impose criminal convictions for contempt, and to put contemnors in jail, why would we interpret Congress’s silence on the issue of noncriminal sanctions as an implicit denial of that power?”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Cleversafe, Inc. v. Amplidata, Inc.