Commonwealth v. Duda’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “¶ 10 The Court in Duda then explained: The present matter differs in that Section 3802 is not simply an amendment to an existing DUI law intended to provide an alternate means of conviction for the offense as substantively defined in the pre-amendment time frame, but instead represents a wholesale re-drafting of the DUI law reflecting a redefinition of the offense_ Section 3802(a) represents a legislative enlargement of the prohibited conduct so that it is now unlawful, not only to drive while under the influence, see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), but also to ingest a substantial amount of alcohol and then operate a motor vehicle before the alcohol is dissipated to below a defined threshold (here, 0.08 percent), regardless of the level of absorption into the bloodstream at the actual moment of driving. That this is so is evident from the plain text of subsection (a)(2), ... which defines the offense to include two elements: that the individual drove after drinking alcohol, and that the amount of alcohol ingested before driving was enough to cause the individual’s BAC level to be at least 0.08 percent and below 0.10 percent within two hours after driving.... It thus follows that Section 3802(a)(2) should not have been invalidated by application of Barud’s reasoning.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Gooseby-Byrd · 2008 Pa. Super. 22 - Commonwealth v. Hilliar

2. “Section 8802(a) represents a legislative enlargement of the prohibited conduct so that it is now unlawful, not only to drive while under the influence, see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), but also to ingest a substantial amount of alcohol and then operate a motor vehicle before the alcohol is dissipated to below a defined threshold (here, 0.08%), regardless of the level of absorption into the bloodstream at the actual moment of driving. That this is so is evident from the plain text of subsection (a)(2), ... which defines the offense to include two elements: that the individual drove after drinking alcohol, and that the amount of alcohol ingested before driving was enough to cause the individuals [blood alcohol] level to be at least 0.08 percent and below 0.10 percent within two hours after driving.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Segida

3. “¶ 8 Finally, the Court concluded that the most glaring deficiency of § 3731(a)(5) is that the statute completely fails to require any proof that the accused’s blood alcohol level actually exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving. Rather, the statute criminalizes a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit up to three hours after the last instance in which the person operated a motor vehicle and without any regard for the level of intoxication at the time of operation. Thus, a person may be prosecuted under § 3731(a)(5) even though his or her blood alcohol did not actually rise above the legal limit of .10% until after the last instance in which he or she drove.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 2007 Pa. Super. 294 - Commonwealth v. Morrison