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← 593 So. 2d 465 - State v. Wells

593 So. 2d 465 - State v. Wells’s Empirical Analysis

1992

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
1
states following
August 2010
most recently cited

8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently August 2010

8 state decisions

70199220002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Illinois v. Gates · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Carroll v. United States · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Chambers v. Maroney

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Probable cause exists when the totality of the circumstances allows the conclusion that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “The “automobile emergency exception” was first mentioned in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). There it was suggested that a warrantless search of an automobile may be justified by necessity arising out of the mobility and imminent possibility of disappearance of the vehicle. Two prerequisites were initially mentioned: probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances requiring an immediate search. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), observed that the capacity to be “quickly moved” was clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll and its progeny which consistently spoke in terms of ready mobility of the motor .vehicle. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes-tempor&ry or otherwise-the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At least in these circumstances, the overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable. 105 S.Ct. at 2070 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.