Covell v. Menkis’s Empirical Analysis
595 F.3d 673 · 2010
Citation profile
3 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee · Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County · Townsend v. Vallas · McMath v. City of Gary
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In order to make his due process claim, Govell must first demonstrate that he had a constitutionally protected property interest. Rujawitz v. Martin, 561 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir.2009) (citingBorder v. City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1996)); Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2007). A person’s interest in a benefit, such as continued employment, constitutes “property” for due process purposes only if “there are such rules or mutually explicit under- . standings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit.” Border, 75 F.3d at 273 . A protected property interest in employment can arise from a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or implied contract, such as “rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Border, 75 F.3d at 273 (citations omitted).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.