595 F. Supp. 2d 607 - Weatherbee Ex Rel. Vecchio v. Richman’s Empirical Analysis
2009
Citation profile
2 district · 3 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (§ 1611 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1382A (§ 1612 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (§ 1900 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396A (§ 1902 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396P (§ 1917 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396R (§ 1919 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1396R (§ 1924 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Conley v. Gibson · Scheuer v. Rhodes · Estelle v. Gamble · Neitzke v. Williams
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(4), when viewed in the context of the subsection as well as pertinent provisions of the Medicaid Act, is unambiguous and does not support the DPW’s reading of it. By its terms, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(4) expressly limits its effect to “this subsection.” It does not purport to alter the well-established rule under the Medicaid Act, contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5, that “no income of the community spouse shall be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1). Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(a)(l) provides that, “[i]n determining the eligibility for medical assistance of an institutionalized spouse ..., the provisions of this section supersede any other provision of this subchapter ... which is inconsistent with them.” In my view, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(4) simply makes clear that which would otherwise be implied. Namely, that disclosing the purchase of an annuity and naming the state as a remainder beneficiary will not, in and of itself, prevent a state from denying eligibility for income or resources derived from an annuity. A state could, for example, deny eligibility for a variety of reasons including, but not necessarily limited to, lack of an actuarially sound annuity or where the income from the annuity was not solely for the benefit of the community spouse. Consistent with the “holistic” approach espoused by the courts in the above cases, and having examined 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(4) in context, I conclude that i”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(e) Disclosure and treatment of annuities (1) In order to meet the requirements of this section for purposes of section 1396a(a)(18) of this title, a State shall require, as a condition for the provision of medical assistance for services described in subsection (c)(1)(C)® of this section (relating to long-term care services) for an individual, the application of the individual for such assistance (including any recertification of eligibility for such assistance) shall disclose a description of any interest the individual or community spouse has in an annuity (or similar financial instrument, as may be specified by the Secretary), regardless of whether the annuity is irrevocable or is treated as an asset. Such application or recertification form shall include a statement that under paragraph (2) the State becomes a remainder beneficiary under such an annuity or similar financial instrument by virtue of the provision of such medical assistance. (2) (A) In the case of disclosure concerning an annuity under subsection (c)(1)(F) of this section, the State shall notify the issuer of the annuity of the right of the State under such subsection as a preferred remainder beneficiary in the annuity for medical assistance furnished to the individual. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as preventing such an issuer from notifying persons with any other remainder interest of the State’s remainder interest under such subsection. (B) In the case of such an issuer receiving notice un”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Geston v. Olson“A community spouse’s income ... is completely protected and does not affect the ... eligibility of the institutionalized spouse. Where the payment of income from a trust or other instrument is made solely in the name of the community spouse, the income is considered to be income to that spouse only, unless the instrument providing the income specifies otherwise. Federal regulations define payments from an annuity as unearned income.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.