¶1(concurring with an exception):
¶2I concur in this decision which correctly affirms the jury verdict and the judgment of the trial court; and I especially endorse and commend the lucid exposition of the proposition that the competency of the testimony of an expert is to be judged on its own merits, and not upon whether it does or does not invade the province of the jury.
¶3On the basis of the facts shown, I think the trial court was well within the latitude of its discretion in sustaining the objection of the question to the officer:
¶4What was the cause of this accident? The soundness of my conclusion that it was at least within the discretion of the trial court to sustain the objection can be made clearer by supposing a slight change in the question:
¶5Who was the cause of this accident? It is obvious that the answer would involve conjecture without an adequate foundation for drawing such a conclusion.
¶6Notwithstanding what has been said above, I confess my inability to appreciate why it is necessary or desirable to disinter the bones and re-decide the Maeshara case. The essential aspect of that case with which disagreement is now voiced is this statement:
We think the trial court was correct in not allowing the officer to in effect reconstruct the accident and the speed and direction of the vehicles on. the basis of such physical evidence as: gouge marks on the lawn and on the curbing, the damage to the automobiles, and the course he assumed they took after the impact. [20 Utah 2d at 154, 434 P.2d at 757.]
¶7The main opinion itself says that the Maeshara case “correctly stated the legal standard to be applied” and then proceeds to argue with its application to the particular facts of that case. I have no desire to engage in any extended discussion in defense of that case. But with due deference to the views of my colleagues and with some regret as to the necessity of disagreeing with them, I feel impelled to record my views as expressed herein.
¶8For a number of reasons, including respect for established adjudications, and for those judges who are no longer here to defend their work, and because of considerations of economy in judicial time and .effort, I have a definite aversion to probing among and disturbing long buried bones; and I do not desire to join therein unless there is some good purpose to be served in doing so, which I am unable to see in this instance. Accordingly, I limit my concur*1333rence to the portion of the opinion which I think correctly states the rule of law and applies it to the facts in this case and note my disagreement with the post-mortem reversal of a case which I think was correctly decided, both as to the law (as stated by the main opinion) and as to its. particular facts.