Commonwealth v. Greer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “STANDARD 15-5.4 LENGTH OF DELIBERATIONS; DEADLOCKED JURY (a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury: (1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; (3) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors; (4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and (5) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. (b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals. (c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 2009 Pa. Super. 174 - Commonwealth v. Marion

2. “Nothing in the law requires that deliberations be aborted because jurors may feel uncomfortable in being directed to listen to each other and to attempt to hammer out their differences. Indeed, if avoidance of conflict or discomfort were the prime directive, we could do away with deliberation entirely and tally private, individual votes from the jury. As the Allen Court noted, and the [Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) ] Court reaffirmed: The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by ai-guments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of [others] who are equally honest and intelligent as himself. To this, we would add (and this is what Spencer refines Allen to accomplish), there is nothing improper in directing all jurors to be open to the arguments of their fellow jurors.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 2009 Pa. Super. 174 - Commonwealth v. Marion