United States v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if, after considering all the evidence, we cannot avoid or ignore a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' " United States v. Jackson , 598 F.3d 340 , 344 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Burnside , 588 F.3d 511 , 517 (7th Cir. 2009) ). "We review the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Edgeworth · United States v. Norton

2. “Possession of a firearm constitutes innocent possession where: (1) the firearm was obtained innocently and held with no illicit purpose; and (2) possession of the firearm was only momentary. If you find that the defendant possessed a firearm and that possession constituted innocent possession, you should find the defendant not guilty.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. U.S. v. Cherry · United States v. Bernard Cherry

3. ““For purposes of searches of closed containers, mere possession of the container by a third party does not necessarily give rise to a reasonable belief that the third party has authority to consent to a search of its contents.” [U.S. v.] Basinski, 226 F.3d [829] at 834 [ (7th Cir.2000)]. “Rather, apparent authority turns on the government’s knowledge of the third party’s use of, control over, and access to the container to be searched, because these characteristics are particularly probative of whether the individual has authority over the property.” Id. Accordingly, we conduct a fact-specific inquiry to decide whether someone had actual or apparent authority to consent to a search. See [U.S. v.] Groves, 530 F.3d [506] at 509-10[ (7th Cir.2008) ]; Basinski, 226 F.3d at 834-35 (observing that “it is less reasonable for a police officer to believe that a third party has full access to a defendant’s purse or a briefcase than, say, an open crate”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Brooks