6 Cal. 4th 1 - People v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 328 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 350 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We briefly review the evidence as it bore on the intent issue: 1. Victim Castro’s murder Defendant strangled Castro to death with a telephone wire and set her room, and probably her body, afire. The method of execution itself precludes any inference the murder was accidental or unintentional. As we have repeatedly held, “this method of killing [strangulation] is indicative of at least a deliberate intent to kill. [Citations.]” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 349 , 253 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 763 P.2d 1289 .) The jury’s first degree murder finding reflected the jury’s determination that Castro’s murder was either (1) premeditated, (2) committed in the course of a burglary, requiring a prexisting specific intent to steal, and/or (3) committed in the course of a rape. On this record, the only reasonable conclusion one can draw from the evidence and the jury’s findings is that defendant intentionally murdered Castro to facilitate his escape and preclude his apprehension after raping her and/or stealing her jewelry. Defendant, relying on an alibi defense, introduced no evidence which would have justified a finding of unintentional homicide. 2. Victim Holmes’s murder As for Holmes, defendant admitted that she became aware of his presence in the house with Castro on the night of the murders. According to witness Fuller, defendant admitted “hitting” Holmes after she came upstairs to inquire about Castro, who was already unconscious from defendant’s assault on her. The evidence s”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. Cullen · 6 Cal. 4th 585 - People v. Cudjo

2. “exhibiting various physical indicia of sleep”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 77 Cal. App. 4th 1123 - People v. Hightower · 95 Cal. App. 4th 1346 - People v. Hernandez

3. “In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 79 , 672 P.2d 862 [parallel citations omitted], we held that intent to kill was a necessary element of the felony-murder special circumstance, and in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 690 P.2d 669 [parallel citations omitted] we extended the Carlos holding to multiple-murder special circumstance. We over-ruled both Carlos and Turner in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 [parallel citations omitted]. As to offenses committed after Carlos and before Anderson , however, due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses. [citations omitted] The offenses here occurred in January 1986, during the foregoing “window period” between Carlos and Anderson . Presumably, the foregoing constitutional considerations would likewise apply to the multiple-murder special circumstance alleged here. The Attorney General does not contend otherwise. Indeed, the People concede that Carlos error occurred here, and they contend that such error was harmless. (See People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1100 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 414-415 , 247 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 754 P.2d 184 [parallel citations omitted.]) Odie concluded that a harmless error analysis pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. Cullen