In re Camille’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 13 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Many oilier senators spoke pro and eon on the question, this being the point of the contest, and these extracts being fail* examples of the opposing opinions. * ::i * It was finally defeated [fhe amendment to strike the word “white” from the naturalization laws]; and Uie amendment cited, extending the right of naturalization to the African only, was adopted. It is clear from lióse proceedings that congress retained the word ‘white’ in the naturalize lion laws for the sole purpose of excluding the Chinese from the right of naturalization. * * * Thus, whatever latitudinarian construction might otherwise have been given to the term ‘white person,’ it is entirely clear that congress intended by this legislation to exclude Mongolians from the right of naturalization. 1 am therefore of the opinion that a native of China, of the Mongolian race, is not a white person, within the meaning of the act of congress. The second question is answered in the discussion of the first. Thu amendment is intended to limit the operation of the provision as it then stood in the Revised Statutes. It would have been more appropriately inserted in section 2165 than where it is found, in section 2169. But the purpose is clear. It was certainly intended to have some operation, or it would not have been adopted. The purpose undoubtedly was to restore the law to ihe condition in which it stood before the revision, and to exclude the Chinese. It was intended to exclude some classes, and, as all white aliens”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Rodriguez

2. ““Words in a statute, other than technical terms, should be taken in 1heir ordinary sense. The words ‘white person,’ as well argued by petitioner’s counsel, taken in a strictly literal sense, constitute a very indefinite description of a class of persons, where none can be said to be literally white, and those called white may be found of every shade from the lightest blonde to the most swarthy brunette. But these words, in this country, at least, have undoubtedly acquired a well-settled meaning in common popular speech, and they are constantly used in the sense so acquired in the literature of the country, as well as in common parlance. As ordinarily used everywhere in the United States, one would scarcely fail to understand that the party employing the words ‘white person’ would intend a person of the Caucasian race.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Ellis

3. ““Perhaps there might be difficulties also as to the copper-colored natives oí America, or the yellow or tawny races of Asiatics, and it may well be doubted whether any of them are white persons, within the purview of the law.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Rodriguez