Dyszel v. Marks’s Empirical Analysis
6 F.3d 116 · 1993
Citation profile
11 federal appellate · 3 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently November 2015 · most notably Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania (1998), Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co. (1999)
11 federal appellate · 3 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005)
Relies on Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. · City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center · Dandridge v. Williams · McGowan v. State of Maryland Gallagher · Plyler v. Doe
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“There is also a clear rational basis to support the Legislature's determination that out-of-state residents who operate autos in New Jersey should be precluded from recovering for non-economic loss unless the verbal threshold is satisfied. Inherent in the no-fault system is a statutory right to recover damages without the need to satisfy a threshold. The cost of such recovery must be paid out of the auto insurance system. Appellants, and those who would fall into their category, are not New Jersey insured. As such, they are not in a position to finance the cost of non-threshold coverage. Given this situation and the Legislature's desire to reduce or contain the cost of auto insurance, the legislative judgment was rationally consistent with the purpose of the statute. Furthermore, if the broadest coverage (no threshold) was provided to persons who did not pay for it, then the added cost to the insurer would have to be borne by others, namely consumers who purchase auto insurance. The Legislature reasonably concluded that such a situation would not foster reduced auto insurance premiums. [ Whitaker, supra, 147 N.J. at 355 , 687 A. 2d 738 (quoting Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F. 3d 116, 127 (3d Cir.1993)).]”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Plaintiffs' equal protection rights have not been transgressed. Section 39:6A-8 provides that New Jersey residents must choose between the verbal and full tort options, 8(a) and (b), respectively. Residents who choose the verbal option lose their right to sue for non-economic loss unless they meet one of the exceptions listed in 8(a). Under the deemer statute, residents of other states who have insurance with companies doing business in New Jersey receive significant benefits as well as certain limitations, such as losing the cause of action for non-economic injuries. For example, the deemer statute ensures that most out-of-state drivers who become involved in accidents in New Jersey receive uninsured motorist protection and $250,000 of personal injury protection. In return for this protection, out-of-state residents who have insurance with companies doing business in New Jersey are required to meet the standards of New Jersey's verbal threshold law in order to sue for non-economic injuries. [ Id. at 126-27 (footnotes omitted).]”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of an automobile to which [ N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], personal injury protection coverage, regardless of fault, applies, and every person or organization legally responsible for his acts or omissions, is hereby exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to a person who is subject to this subsection and who is either a person who is required to maintain the coverage mandated by this act, or is a person who has a right to receive benefits under [ N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4], as a result of bodily injury, arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of such automobile in this State, unless that person has sustained a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute that person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment; ... [ N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a.]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.