The Cynosure

¶1The libellant, a man of color, was a mariner on board the American ship Cynosure, on a voyage to New Orleans. On arriving at that port he was, pursuant to a statute of the state of Louisiana,3 taken from the ship, and committed to jail. [He was detained there during the stay of the vessel, and delivered up to the master when the vessel sailed.]4 The master was compelled to pay the expenses of that imprisonment, and now claims to have the amount deducted from the wages of the mariner. The libellant, on the other hand, claims compensation in damages, for being carried to New Orleans, and subjected to imprisonment. The statute referred to, prohibits free persons of color from coming into the state, as mariners on board any vessel, and requires them to be imprisoned, and the master to give bonds to carry them out of the state, and compels him to pay the expenses of their imprisonment. A state cannot thus interfere with the navigation of the United States, nor dictate to the owners of an American vessel the composition of her crew. The only ground of disability is color. If one color may be excluded, any other may; — if dark complexions may be subject to prohibition, white may be equally so; — or both whites and blacks may be excluded; or any other physical quality, or religious or political opinion, may be selected as the criterion of exclusion, or admission. If the parties may be subjected to imprisonment, expenses and bonds, any other penalties and punishments may be inflicted. Such legislation is not consistent with the regulations of commerce established by the laws of the United States, pursuant to authority expressly given by the constitution; and this statute is invalid.

¶2Another provision of the constitution declares, that the “citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” Article 4, § 2.

¶3That provision seems to be wholly ignored by the Louisiana statute. This, however, is not material in the present case, because there is no allegation, or proof, that the libel-lant was a citizen of any state. He is not, therefore, in a position to invoke the protection of that clause of the constitution.

¶4The libellant shipped to go to any port or ports in the United States, for a term of six months. The master, in going to New Orleans, did no more than he lawfully might, and was not bound to anticipate that his crew would there be subjected to unconstitutional imprisonment. The claim for damages is not, therefore, sustained.

¶5The expenses were paid by the master, not by request of the mariner, but by the express requirement of the statute. If this burden was rightfully imposed, it now rests where the law has placed it; if wrongfully, there is no reason why the master, on whom it has fallen, should throw it upon the mariner, who is quite as blameless. No deduction is to be made from the wages.

¶6See the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, delivered in South Carolina, in the case of Elltison v. Deliesseline [Case No. 4,300]; The Wilson [Id. 17,840]; Roberts v. Yates [Id. 11,911)].