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6 Ga. 587

Brewer v. Brewer

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided May 15, 1849

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1849-05-15

Assumpsit, in Jasper Superior Court. Tried before Judge Merriwetiier, April Term, 1849. Suit was commenced by the executors of Drewry Brewer against Clark Brewer, upon the following acknowledgment: “ I do hereby acknowledge the credit of three hundred and thirty-two 50-100 dollars to be due to the estate of Drewry Brewer, deceased.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1849-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently October 1957

7 state decisions

40184918501860187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court.

Lumpkin, J.

¶2delivering the opinion.

¶3*589Does the written acknowledgment of Clark Brewer, given to the executors of Drewry Brewer, take the case out of the Statute of Limitations ?

¶4[1.] To my mind it is, to all intents and purposes, a due hill, and might very properly have been declared on as such. The presiding Judge, in ruling that this acknowledgment was not sufficient to take the case out of the Statute, cited as authority, the decisions of this Court. None are designated. We apprehend that His Honor was misled by the oral report of some unpublished opinion.

¶5In Dickinson vs. McCamy, (5 Ga. Rep. 486,) we say — “A direct promise to pay is not indispensably necessary. Nor is any set form of words requisite to take the case out of the Statute. The acknowledgment, however, must admit that the debt continues due at the time of making it.” And in Broach vs. Marlin and others, (6 Ga. Rep. 21,) this Court expressly recognize and adopt the position of Mr. Angell on this subject, namely : that the new promise, to take the case out of the Statute, may be either express or implied; and that an implied promise will he inferred from a clear and unqualified acknowledgment of the debt. Not that it was once due and owing, but that the liability still subsists. Beyond this we have never gone.

¶6Believing, therefore, that the written acknowledgment of the defendant in this case is sufficient, both on the score of amplitude and definiteness, we must reveíase the judgment.

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