Volume 6 — Gill's Maryland Reports

<p>Appeal from Baltimore County Court.</p> <p>This cause was before the court at December term, 1843, and is reported in 1 Gill, 127. It was an action of assumpsit brought on the 9th October, 1840, by the present appellants against the present appellee.</p> <p>The bill of exchange on which the action was founded is as follows:</p> <p>Baltimore, Isi January, 1840.</p> <p>11,500. W. B.</p> <p>Ninety days after date please pay to the order of David Whiteford, fifteen hundred dollars, which charge, as advised, to account of Your ob’t serv’t,</p> <p>Nicholas U. Chafee.</p> <p>To Messrs. Blum Cobia, merchants, Charleston, S. C.</p> <p>Endorsed—D. Whiteford. Pay to the order of Messrs. C. Burckmyer fy Co. Th. Phbnix.</p> <p>The protest of this bill for non-acceptance was dated 6th January, 1840. The answer to the notary was “we decline accepting for want of advice.” The notices of protest were certified to have been enclosed by the notary to Th. Phenix, cashier Western Bank of Baltimore.</p> <p>1st Exception.—At the trial of this cause, the plaintiffs read in evidence the bill of exchange, and proved the signature of JY. U. C. the drawer, and of the defendant, as endorser, by the name of I). Whiteford; the protest of the bill; and the affidavit of the notary public who made the protest, viz.</p> <p>“ Personally appeared on this 16th day of July, 1841, before me, Henry Morris, N. P. duly commissioned and sworn, Jl. C. Smith, N. P. and made oath that he did, on the 6th of January, 1840, protest a draft for non-acceptance drawn by JY. U. C. on B. 8f C. endorsed by I). W. for $1,500. The said draft was dated 1st January, 1840, at 90 days, protested by order of Messrs. C. Burckmyer Co. The said Jl. C. S. further testifies that he forwarded a written notice addressed to JY. U. C. drawer, and also a written notice addressed to D. W. endorser, informing them of the protest of said draft, and that the holders thereof looked to them for the payment of the same, by mail, under cover to Tho. Phenix, Esq. cashier of the W. Bank, B. and which were placed in the post office here on the 6th January, 1840, the date of protest.</p> <p>A. C. Smith, JYotary Public.</p> <p>Witness my hand and seal at Charleston the day and year above written. Henry Morris, JYotary Public.”</p> <p>The plaintiffs then proved that by the course of the mail in January, 1840, letters mailed in Charleston, S. C. on 6th January, 1840, would be received in Baltimore on the morning of the 11th January, 1840: and that in January, 1840, Thomas Phenix was the cashier of the W. B. of B. which bank had discounted said draft for the use of the drawer, and on the 2d January, 1840, had remitted the same to the plaintiffs at C. as its agents, for collection.</p> <p>The plaintiffs then read in evidence the agreement of counsel for both parties, viz.</p> <p>“ It is admitted on the part of defendant that the plaintiffs were in partnership as alleged in the declaration, and that their Christian names are truly set forth. It is also admitted that the affidavit by the notary public read on the former trial shall be used on the next trial; and the plaintiffs agree on their part to produce the original letters (or copies of them) from the cashier of W. B. to plaintiffs, enclosing the draft in suit originally to plaintiffs, and the letter of plaintiffs returning the same to W. B. previous to suit—the copies to be used as originals. It being understood that each party reserves all exception to the materiality of the matters above specified, and that this agreement shall not affect the order of proof, or relieve either party from the necessity of offering the above matters as his evidence.”</p> <p>The defendant then proved by said T. Phenix that said draft was returned to him in a letter of plaintiffs dated 26th Sept. 1840, and that after receiving it he struck out the special endorsement thereon, signed “ Th. Phenix, Cashier.”</p> <p>Whereupon the plaintiffs’ counsel proposed to ask said Phenix to state the reasons which induced him to strike out said endorsement, but the court (Le Grand, A. J.) refused to allow said question to be put to the witness. The plaintiffs excepted.</p> <p>2d Exception.—After the evidence stated in the aforegoing exception, made a part hereof, the plaintiffs further proved by said P. that he left the city of B. on business of the bank, on the afternoon of the 9th January, 1840, and did not return for several days; and then further proved by James Hall that in January, 1840, he was the corresponding clerk of the W. B. and as such, it was his business to examine and attend to the correspondence addressed to said Phenix, the cashier.</p> <p>The plaintiffs then produced to said witness, Hall, a book marked “ bill book,” which the witness verified as a book regularly kept by him in the Western Bank, as its corresponding clerk, and which was kept in said bank as a bank book, to which its officers had access. And the said Hall further stated, that said book shews by the entries therein the date of each draft discounted by said bank, the amount thereof, the time when due, the time when sent by mail for collection, and how charged, and that the entries therein were made by said Hall, as such clerk, in the regular and daily course of his business as such clerk,</p> <p>The plaintiffs’ counsel, for the purpose of showing when the notices referred to in the aforegoing affidavit of the notary were received at the Western Bank, then proved by said Hall that the entries in said book in relation to the draft now in suit were made by him in the course of his business, and that it was his uniform practice to make all his entries truly and at the time of each transaction; and that the words “ JV. JL 11 th January, 1840,” written against the entries relating to the draft in suit, in said bill book, are in the proper hand-writing of said Hall, and that they mean and are intended to signify that notice of the non-acceptance of said draft on that day received by him as such corresponding clerk, and that the said Hall has no doubt of the accuracy and verity of said entry, although he has no recollection of the fact of such notice being received at any time. And the said plaintiffs at the same time read to the jury the original entries in said book, including the words “JV. JZ. 11th January, 1840.”</p> <p>The plaintiffs then further proved by Taylor, that in January, 1840, he was runner of the W. B. and as such it was his business to serve all notices placed in his hands by the officers of said bank, to be served on residents in the city of B. and that it was his invariable practice to serve said notices on the day they were delivered to him. That the said witness recollects having called some time in January, 1840, at the place of business of the defendant with a notice of protest for him, and another for JV. U. C. That he read enough of said notices to see who were the parties to be notified, and that they were notices of protest, but he did not read every word or the date of said notices. That he handed the notice made out for the defendant to him, remarking that it was a protest for him and Chafee, who returned it to him with a request that he would give it to said C. and said witness accordingly left the same at the dwelling house of said C. on same day. That said witness, Taylor, has no recollection of the day of the month on which he delivered said notice to said defendant, hut he recollects that the ground was then covered with a very deep snow, the heaviest snow in that winter, and that he recollects no other notice to defendant in said month.</p> <p>The plaintiffs then further proved by Th. Phenix, that when he left Baltimore on the afternoon of the 9th January, 1840, and for several days before, there was a very deep snow on the ground, so deep that some days before said 9th January the travelling had been obstructed. That said Phenix was compelled to travel in a sleigh from Harpers Ferry in Virginia, to Winchester, on the 10th January, and from thence to Woodstock, in a sleigh, on the 11th and 12th January, 1840, and that said snow was the heaviest of the winter, according to the recollection of said Phenix. The plaintiffs then further proved by said Phenix that before this suit was commenced, and early in October, 1840, and after the bill in suit was returned to him by the aforesaid letter of 26th September, 1840, he took the bill and protest to Whiteford, the defendant, and asked him for payment. That defendant expressed great surprise, and said he had no notice of protest for non-payment. Witness replied the bank had none either, but you had notice of non-acceptance, to which Whiteford replied, “ yes I might have had that,” and objected to payment for want of notice of protest for nonpayment. The plaintiffs further proved by said Phenix, that said draft had been retained in Charleston aforesaid, by plaintiffs, from January, 1840, until the 26th September, 1840, and that the said Phenix never received any notice of its protest for non-payment, or any communication from plaintiffs relating thereto, after the month of January, 1840, until by said letter of 26th September, 1840.</p> <p>And the plaintiff's further proved by said James Hall, that he was corresponding clerk of the W. B. until the 26th September, 1840, and he never received or saw any notice relating to said draft, shewing a protest for non-payment, or of presentment at maturity for payment thereof. The plaintiffs then further proved that this suit was brought on the 9th November, 1840, as appears by the original docket entries, and that by á clerical misprision the writ was stated as having been issued on the 9th October, 1840.</p> <p>Thereupon, the plaintiffs, for the purpose of shewing that the plaintiffs had a right to maintain this suit, and to shew possession and right of possession in them, of the draft now in suit, at the institution of this suit, offered to prove by Thomas Phenix that on the 2d October, 1840, he wrote to the plaintiffs the original letter, post-marked at Baltimore, of that date, now shewn him by plaintiffs’ attorneys.</p> <p>W. B. Baltimore, Oct. 2, 1840.</p> <p>Messrs. C. B. & Co.</p> <p>Dear Sirs:—I regret to inform you that the endorser on the bill, returned to me a few days since, on Blum 8f Cobia, inclines to take advantage of the absence of protest for nonpayment. By reference to my letter of 2d January last, you will perceive the importance attached to the name of the endorser, and having lost all remedy against him by your omitting to protest, your knowledge of commercial affairs must admit the justness of my claim against your house for the bill. I have therefore charged your account, and expect a credit for it. Messrs. Caldwell Sons and Blum (f Cobia, being consignees ofJV. U. C. I am in hopes you can find property enough in their hands to protect you from loss.</p> <p>Very respectfully,</p> <p>Th. Phenix, Cashier.</p> <p>Post-marked—uBaltimore, Md. October 2d,” and addressed, “Messrs. C. B. 8f Co. Charleston, S. C.”</p> <p>That in point of fact he enclosed in said letter the draft now in suit, and sent it in said letter, and then offered to read said letter to the jury to be considered by them with the aforesaid statements of said Phenix in relation to the said draft having been enclosed therein, but the court (Le Grand, A. J.) refused to allow said letter and said evidence of said Phenix so offered to be given to the jury, and excluded the same as inadmissible, and the plaintiffs excepted.</p> <p>3d Exception.—After the evidence stated in the aforegoing bill of exceptions as having been given and offered, (which bill of exception is made a part hereof) the plaintiffs, further to prove by said Phenix, that on the 2d October, 1840, he enclosed the draft in suit in the letter aforesaid, of that date, now produced by plaintiffs’ counsel, and sent the same by mail to the plaintiffs; and the plaintiffs then offered to give in evidence, by said Phenix, the fact of said letter having enclosed said draft at the time of its being mailed for transmission to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ counsel stating at the same time that he offered said fact with a view to, and for the purpose of shewing possession of said draft in suit, in the plaintiffs at the institution of this suit, but the court refused to allow said fact so offered in evidence to be given to the jury, and excluded the same, together with the statements of said Phenix in relation thereto, and the plaintiffs excepted.</p> <p>4th Exception.—After the evidence stated in the aforegoing bills of exceptions, (made a part hereof) the plaintiffs further offered to prove by .said Phenix that he received, in January, 1840, the original letter of plaintiffs, now produced, dated 6th January, 1840, and post-marked at Charleston, S. C. same day.</p> <p>Charleston, January 6th, 1840.</p> <p>Mr. T. Phenix, Balt.</p> <p>Dear Sir:—Your valued favor of the 2d is at hand with Chajee's draft on Blum 8f Cobia for §1,500, which we are sorry to say is under protest for non-acceptance, and the other on them is not yet accepted, but they express an opinion that it will be paid.</p> <p>We now hand you, enclosed, Hopkins 8f SlockloPs dft. accpt. for §2,000, protested for non-payment, and charge you the same with protests. . Yours, in haste,</p> <p>C. B. & Co.</p> <p>Post-marked—u Charleston, Jan. 6th,” and addressed to “ T. P., Esq. Cashier W. B., BP</p> <p>That on the 30th September, 1840, he wrote to plaintiffs the letter of that date, post-marked on same day at B. the original of which is now produced to said witness by plaintiffs’ counsel..</p> <p>Western Bank of Baltimore,"^</p> <p>Baltimore, Sept. 30, 1840. 3</p> <p>Messrs. C. B. & Co.</p> <p>Bear Sirs:—I have received your favor of the 26th inst. with enclosures as stated. The draft on Blum Cobia ought to have been protested for non-payment, to hold the endorser the most responsible name on it. I have sent notices to the parties, and should the endorser demur, I will advise you forthwith. Very respectfully,</p> <p>T. P., Cashier.</p> <p>Post-marked—llB., Md.n and directed to “ Messrs. C. B. ¡T Co., C., S. C.”</p> <p>And that on the 2d October, 1840, he wrote to plaintiffs the aforesaid letter of that date, and that the same enclosed the draft in suit, and that the said P. as cashier of the W. B. received, in due course of mail, the original letter of the plaintiffs, dated 7th October, 1840, and post-marked at C., S. C. on same date, and that the draft in suit was enclosed in said letter.</p> <p>C., October 1th, 1840.</p> <p>Mr. T. P., Balto.</p> <p>Bear Sir:—Your favor of the 30th ult. and 2d inst. are at hand, returning C’s dft. on Blum 8f Cobia, $1,500. This dft. was regularly noted for non-acceptance, and the drawer and endorser furnished with notice of same. Our young man laid it away in our chest where it was overlooked, but as Messrs. Blum fy Cobia had not, nor has since had, any funds of the drawer, we do not think much of the honor of the endorser who would take advantage of an oversight when no loss has accrued to him thereby. We presume, according to strict mercantile usage, we are responsible to you, but only when you have proceeded against the draft, and obtained from the parties all you can; the balance, if any, we will have to make up. We, therefore, return you the draft with protest for non-acceptance. For the purpose, however, of settling this unfortunate business, if you can make a compromise with them at once, and yield up a part, we will make up the deficiency at once.</p> <p>We remain yours, respectfully,</p> <p> C. B. Co. </p> <p>Neither Messrs. Blum, Cobia, or Messrs. Caldwell fy Sons, have any property of Mr. Chafee’s.</p> <p>N. B. We charge C. B. Co. with the above this day, 12th October.</p> <p>Post-marked—“G., S. C., Oct. 7,” and directed to ‘■'■Mr. T. P., Cashier W. B., BP</p> <p>That immediately on the receipt of that letter the said P. as cashier of said bank, caused said draft to be charged on the books of the said bank to account of the plaintiffs, and at the same time offered to read said entry making said charge, which it is agreed is made in the. proper book of said bank, and shews the entry of such charge on the 12th October, 1840, both parties agreeing to dispense with a copy of said entry in this exception.</p> <p>And the plaintiffs, at the same time, offered to prove by said P. that he wrote the original letter to plaintiffs, dated 31st October, 1840, and post-marked same day at Baltimore, which is now shown him by plaintiffs’ counsel.</p> <p>W. B., Baltimore, Oct. 31, 1840.</p> <p>Messrs. C. B. & Co.</p> <p>Dear Sirs:—A favorable opinion of the attorney to whom I have entrusted the case against the drawer and endorser on the bill of $1,500, not accepted by Messrs. Blum 8f Cobia, induces me to suggest to you that a discretionary power he left us in regard to a compromise. In your last favor, the order seemed to be peremptory on us to offer a settlement with the parties, and that at a heavy sacrifice.</p> <p>By your permission we will defer this for the present, believing that a little delay will be to your interest, and by holding out, better terms can be made.</p> <p>Please advise by return mail.</p> <p>Very resp’y, T. P., Cashier.</p> <p>Post-marked—“B., Md., Oct. 81,” and directed to “Messrs. C. B. $ Co., Charleston, S. C.</p> <p>And that he received, in due course of mail, plaintiffs’ original letter in reply thereto, dated Charleston, Nov. 5, 1840.</p> <p>C., JYov. 5, 1840.</p> <p>T. P., Esa., Baltimore.</p> <p>Dear Sir:—Your valued favor of 31st reached us this day. W e authorize you to take any course you may deem for your interest in the settlement of the dft. on Blum óf Cobia, observing to you, however, that we should prefer a reasonable sacrifice to get the business settled at once, and, if agreeable to you, we would be glad if you would name what sum you would take from us to relieve us from all responsibility in this business. We understand that the endorser on the draft is quite an honorable man, and if so, we are satisfied that no honest man would take advantage of an unintentional omission to relieve himself from responsibility when no loss could eventuate to him. You will, of course, consider this letter as confidential, and not let the parties be acquainted with any anxiety on our part to compromise. Yours truly,</p> <p>C. B. & Co.</p> <p>And that it was received before the suit was brought.</p> <p>The plaintiffs further offered to prove by said Phenix, that before this suit was brought, he handed the enclosed note to Mr. J. V. L. McMahon, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, and requested him to bring suit thereon in the name of the plaintiffs.</p> <p>And the plaintiffs further offered to prove by Wm. H. Collins, Esq., that at the time this suit was brought he was in possession of the draft in suit, and had been for several weeks before, and that he is the same counsel whose name is signed to the declaration in this cause. The plaintiffs’ counsel stating at the same time, that he offered the whole of said offered evidence for the purpose of showing such an interest or possession in the draft or bill in suit, by the plaintiffs, at the institution of this suit, as would enable them to maintain this action in their names. But the court refused to allow the said offered evidence, or any part thereof, to be given to the jury, and excluded the same and every part thereof, to which action and refusal of the court, the plaintiffs excepted.</p> <p>5th Exception.—After the evidence stated in the aforegoing exceptions, (made a part hereof) and the evidence being closed, the plaintiffs, by their counsel, prayed the court to instruct the jury that there is evidence in this cause from which the jury may find a sufficient interest in the plaintiffs to maintain this suit, and that the defendant had notice of the protest for nonacceptance of the draft or bill in suit, on the 11th or 13th January, 1840, but the court refused to grant said instruction, and plaintiffs excepted.</p> <p>The verdict and judgment of the court below being in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.</p>

<p>The plaintiff's, on the 21st September, 1844, filed proceedings in Baltimore County Court, under the act of 1838, ch. 205, to establish a lien for work and labor done upon a house in the city of Baltimore, at the request of J. The claim filed showed that the work had been done between May and September, 1844, and the proof offered in support of it was the written admission of J. made in September, 1844, that the claim was correct. It appeared that in July, 1844, he had mortgaged this property to W. Held : That a mortgage would afford very little security for the debt intended to be secured thereby, if, after its execution, the mortgagor could by admissions create liens on the mortgaged premises ; and thereby lessen or destroy the value of the mortgage.</p> <p>The mortgagor can by no acknowledgment subsequent to the mortgage, prejudice the interest of the mortgagee; and hence the admission in tiffs case ought not to have been received.</p> <p>A mortgagee, in such a case, claiming the property sought to be affected by the plaintiff's, may appear to and defend the action.</p> <p>This proceeding was in rem.</p> <p>The trustees of the debtor-mortgagor, under the insolvent laws, might have appeared to defend the equity of redemption.</p> <p>Our attachment laws do not expressly authorize a claimant of property to appear to an attachment; yet claimants are permitted to interpose their claim against a judgment of condemnation.</p> <p>Wo mechanic, in virtue of the act of 1838, has a lien on the house which he has built or repaired, unless he has filed in the office of the Clerk of Baltimore County Court, a statement of his demand, and in that statement has given, not only the sum due, but also the nature and kind of work done, and the kind and amount of materials furnished, and the time when the work was done and materials furnished.</p> <p>To obtain such a lien, the statement filed must state the particulars of his demand, the items, whereby all who may be interested can ascertain not only the amount demanded, hut the correctness and reasonableness of the demand itself.</p> <p>These statements, when filed, must be explicit and comprehensive, to protect strangers to the contract, who may have other contracts relating to the same property or liens thereon, from fraud, and may be required by the party at whose request the work is performed.</p>

The hill in this cause was filed on the 16th January, 1845, hy the appellee against the appellants.

This was an action of assumpsit, filed by consent to September term, 1844, by the appellants against the appellees. Held: when it was resolved, that the president appoint a committee, to prepare by-laws to be submitted to the next meeting; and that at the next meeting, which took place upon the 18th December, 1840, it was resolved, not to accept the by-laws reported by the committee until a future meeting, when a greater number of the board should be…

The bill in this case was filed by the appellee against the appellant and David Ridgely, on the 10th May, 1845, and alleged, that Absalom Ridgely, hy his last will, gave and bequeathed to his wife, Ann Ridgely, during her life, the dividends which should accrue or become due on one hundred shares of stock of the Farmers Bank of Maryland; and subject to said bequest, and other bequests and devises contained in said last will; in relation to other parcels of his estate, he…

The bill in this cause was filed by the appellant on the 7th September, 1837, and alleged that in 1818, William Hobbs, of S. fyc. deceased, being seized and… Held: occupied and enjoyed, under enclosures, as this defendant’s own absolute property, and this defendant relies upon this long and uninterrupted possession, by enclosures, for more than forty years as a bar to any claim thereto set up by the said bill. He admits the execution of the single bill, complainant’s Ex.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the appellants against the appellees. The defendants pleaded the general issue. 1st Exception.

<p>Where the court is called upon to instruct the jury as to the law arising on the facts, this impliedly assumes the correctness of the pleadings.</p> <p>Where a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations, but for its revival by a subsequent promise to pay, it is not necessary to declare upon the new promise. Its effect is to revive the old, original, cause of action, by removing the statutory bar. It is not material whether the new promise be absolute or conditional. It is a matter of evidence, not of pleading. If conditional, it must appear to have been performed.</p> <p>Where a debtor promises that, if allowed a little time, he would pay all his debts, and the creditor forbore to sue for two years, that is sufficient performance.</p> <p>Whether a new promise, made by a debtor within the time of limitations, applies to the original debt, is a fact for the jury.</p> <p>Before the court can grant a prayer of the defendant—that the evidence offered by the plaintiff does hot remove the bar of the statute of limitations—it must assume the truth of every fact, in support of the plaintiff’s claim, which the jury, under the testimony, are competent to find.</p> <p>To remove the bar of the act of limitations, it is not necessary that the creditor, at the time of a new promise, should exhibit the evidence of his claim, or state the precise nature or amount thereof. These are facts for the jury, who must find to what debt or claim the new promise related. If the plaintiff shows but a single indebtedness, it may apply to that; and then, if the debtor alleges a different debt, the onus of proving it rests on him.</p>

This was an action of covenant, commenced on the 30th August, 1842, by the appellee against the appellant, to recover a loss by fire, under a policy of insurance of the appellants.

The bill in this cause was filed on the 28th May, 1839, for the sale of the Holliday Street Theatre, in the City of Haiti-more.

The bill in this cause was filed on the 20th November, 1840, by the appellee, who claimed as husband of Elizabeth Hilleary, now deceased, leaving an infant child, Elizabeth Hurdle; and also under the will of Eleanor Mulliken, the grandmother of all the defendants, except Clement T., and also of Mary Hurdle.

<p>Although a testator may, as between the devisees of his real and personal estate, prescribe the mode in which his debts shall be discharged; and the dispositions made by his will, will be obligatory upon those who accept it; yet he has no power to withdraw from his creditors the personal estate—the primary fund for the satisfaction of their claims.</p> <p>In a contest between an executor and a specific legatee, it appeared that the former, before the settlement of his accounts, had delivered to the latter the personal property, devised to her upon an agreement on her part to refund, if it should turn out that there was a deficiency of other assets to pay debts. The personal assets and some real estate, devised to be sold for payment of debts, proved insufficient, when the legatee was decreed to refund. As between such parties, the court refused to entertain the question—whether the testator intended to charge other portions of his real estate, which he had also devised to other parties, with the payment of his debts.</p> <p>If it were the intention of the testator to exempt his - personal estate from the payment of debts, the specific legatee of such estate might be subrogated to the rights of creditors, and claim to be reimbursed by the devisees of the realty. A hill for that object might still be filed by the legatee, when the interpretation of the will, as to that question, would be determined.</p> <p>A legacy, delivered by an executor to a legatee, upon the entire confidence, sincerely entertained, that the assets of his testator would he sufficient for the payment of debts, but which proved to be inadequate, without default in the executor, may be recovered in equity.</p> <p>A mere agreement to refund does not, in such a case, affect the rights of the parties.</p> <p>Payment of a legacy, voluntarily made on a mistaken ground of fact, may be reclaimed.</p> <p>Gratuitous services of great merit, rendered by a legatee to his testator, do not constitute the legatee a purchaser of his legacy.</p> <p>A general legacy, given in consideration of a debt due the legatee, or relinquishment of any right or interest since the bequest, is not made as a bounty,, but as purchase money, and will he entitled to a preference of payment over other general voluntary legacies.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, and was before this court in 1840.—11 G. The defendants pleaded not guilty, and took defence on warrant, and upon return of the plats “ for all the land lying between the south side of Alice Anna street, and the north side of Lancaster street, and the west side of Eden street and Canal street.” 1st Exception.

The bill in this cause was filed by the appellants on the 2d May, 1845, and represented that the late Jeremiah Townley Chase was, in his life-time, seized of sundry lots on Whetstone Point, in the City of Baltimore, and being so seized at the time of his death, by his last will and testament, so executed as to pass real estate, devised the same to his grand-children, and departed this life; that at the time of his death, there were living the following grand-children, &c.;…

This was an action of debt, brought by the appellees against the appellants, to recover the sum of $750 debt. The plaintiffs counted upon a lease made by JYicholas Owings, deceased, to the defendants, of a granite quarry in Baltimore County, as owner in fee, dated 11th June, 1840, for the term of six years from the 10th November following.

This was a special action on the case, brought by the appellee against the appellant, as the possessor and occupier of a certain house, near unto a common street, in which said street there was and is, a certain area before a certain basement window of, and belonging to the said house, for the purpose of admitting light into said window; that the defendant, &c. wrongfully permitted the said area to be and continue, without any fence, railing, cover or protection, by means…

Afpeal from the Court of Chancery. The bill in this cause was filed on the 4th November, 1840, by the appellee, and alleged that on the 29th September, 1836, he entered into an agreement with Susan R. Dorsey, (now Costigan,) for the sale of certain lands, and crops growing thereon, except fodder, for $9,000, payable in ah order on Vernon Dorsey, of Mississippi, to pay the appellee the amount, by either buying himself negroes of the said Susan, now in said Vernon’s…

This cause was before this court at this term (ante 97) in another form; the statements there reported constitute a part of this, and with the additional statements contained in the opinion of the… Held: for the purpose of becoming a witness in this case—understanding that course was necessary for that purpose.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought on the 24th January, 1844, by the appellees against the appellants, Thomas H. Per-due and William JYichols, trading under the firm of Perdue, JYichols Co. The appellant only appeared below, and pleaded non-assumpsit.

This was an action of debt, brought by the appellants against the appellees, to recover $500 rent on a lease, made by Nicholas Owings on the 11th June, 1840, to the appellees, for the term of six years. The lessees were to enter the demised premises on the 11th November, 1840, and the rent claimed Was for the first year.

Cross Appeals from the Court of Chancery. The bill in this cause was filed on the ISth December, 1839, by Isaac G. Magruder and wife, and alleged that Elizabeth, his wife, was one of the heirs of Richard Hill, who died in the year 1816, possessed of real and personal property; that in a few years his widow, Margaret Hill, intermarried with Francis L. Darnall, who jointly with Joseph Wilson, administered on the personal estate of Richard Hill; that after said administrators…

This was an action of assumpsit, brought to January term, 1846, by the appellants against the appellees. The defendants pleaded non-assumpsit. A verdict was rendered for them, when the plaintiffs prosecuted this appeal.

This was a petition for freedom, filed on the 22d October, 1846, by the appellant against the appellee. The petition alleged that the petitioner is held in bondage by Jacob Willson of said county, and is claimed by him as his slave.

This was an attachment, sued out on the 9th March, 1846, by the appellee against James M. Raisin, and laid in the hands of The Western Bank of Baltimore, on the 11 th of that month. It was founded on a decree obtained in Baltimore County Court, as a Court of Equity, on the 22d December, 1841, for $3,200, &c.; revived on the 10th November, 1845.

By a resolution of the General Assembly of Maryland, passed at its December session, 1846, the Attorney General was directed to institute suit against the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-road Company, to recover the dividend of $15,000, which had been declared by that Company, payable in part in the bonds of said Company.

JYicholas Worthington of Jno., late of Howard District, by his will, duly executed and admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of said District, manumitted and set free all his negro slaves, and appointed the appellee his executor. The 'slaves thus manumitted were appraised in the inventory at $15,433, on the 4th December, 1847.

On the 28th April, 1847, the appellants, the trustees of the Methodist Protestant Church, East Baltimore Station, filed their bill in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, in which they allege that in their corporate capacity, they are the owners of a certain lot of ground situated on the corner of Pitt and, Jlisquith streets, in the city of Baltimore, on which is erected a building regularly used as a place of public worship, by the religious society embodied under the…

The appellee filed his bill on the 8th September, 1846, alleging, that on the 23d January, 1846, the complainant and a certain Edward M. Kerr commenced, in the city of Baltimore, a wholesale and retail “ Queensware and China business,” under the name and firm of “ E. M. Kerr Co.” That the business of said firm was large and heavy, and the liabilities and obligations outstanding and unpaid are very considerable, as are also the debts now due the same, and the goods and…

Writ of Error to Baltimore City Court. At the October term, 1845, of Baltimore City Court, Martin Smith, the appellant, was indicted for leasing a house to one Boreas Smith with the knowledge that the said Boreas Smith intended to keep therein a common bawdy house.

The original bill in this case, was filed on the 18th July, 1832, by the appellees against Geo. IT.

On the 29th March, 1839, a bill was filed on the equity side of said court, by Margaret Hermange and Mary H. Hannon, for the sale of certain real estate lying in the city of Baltimore, which had been mortgaged to the complainants by one George Riston, and afterwards conveyed by said Riston to Henry B. Griffith, who had deceased prior to the filing of the bill, and whose widow and heirs were made defendants.

Appeals from the Orphans Court of Charles County. On the 18th September, 1838, the appellees, as executors of the last will and testament of Walter W. Hannon, offered to the Orphans court of Charles County for probate, the will of their testator, dated the 16th May, 1838, whereby, after payment of debts and funeral charges, &c., the testator devises as follows: “ Item—I give and bequeath to my daughter, Grace Finn Robey, wife of William Gerard Robey, my dwelling plantation,…

The appellant, as guardian of Nancy J. Walgamot, on the 1st April, 1847, filed a petition in Washington County Court, alleging that she was a creditor to a large amount of a certain John Davis, who had conveyed all his property to his son, Charles W. Davis, for the benefit of his creditors. That said trustee has given no bond for the faithful performance of his trust as required by law, as will appear from the certificate of the clerk of Washington County, hereto attached.

On the 22d February, 1847, the appellant filed his bill against Charles B. Calvert, executor of George Calvert and others, alleging that Thomas Cramphin died in the year 1830, leaving a last will and testament, and codicils thereto, by which he appointed George Calvert his executor and residuary legatee.