¶1delivered the opinion of the court.
¶2This case was brought before the court on a motion to dismiss the appeal. It is expressed in the following terms. “ On motion, &c., it is ordered that the plaintiffs and appellants show cause, &c., why this appeal should not be dismissed, there being no statement of facts, and not having been returned on the return day.”
¶3In the course of argument the counsel for the appellee offered as an additional reason, why the appeal should not be dismissed, the want of citation after the appeal to the proper term of the Appellate Court. This mode of argument is objected to by the appellants, as inadmissible, insisting that the> mover should not be permitted to avail himself of any means to dismiss, except those contained in his motion. We are, however, of a different opinion. When a motion is made to dismiss an appeal, it is not required of the mover to state any reasons for the purpose of obtaining an order on his adversary to show cause. He would consequently be at liberty to show any legal causes of dismissal, ore terms, on the trial of the rule, and it seems to us to follow, as a corollary, that if all reasons to dismiss may be offered on the discussion of the rule, without having been expressed in it, the circumstance of some having been thus expressed, cannot lawfully preclude the adduction of others.
¶4The article of the Code of Practice, 583, relied on by the appellee’s counsel, to show the fatal effect of the want of citation to the proper term of the Appellate Court, has in several instances received our interpretation and the text of law itself, as well as the decisions of the court, all favor his pretentions.
¶5In the present instance, the petition of appeal was filed in May last, and the order of the court below made it returnable to the first Monday in June term, of the Appellate Court. To appear on that day, the appellee ought to have been cited, if there was time sufficient after the rendition of the judgment in the District Court, in pursuance of the delay allowed by law, if not to the first day of the next succeeding term. The record affords no evidence, pro or con, as to the *115sufficiency .of time to make the appeal returnable to the term of the Supreme Court, immediately succeeding the sighing of the judgment in the court below; but as it was made thus returnable, the fair presumption is, that the time was sufficient. Being of opinion, that on this ground alone the appeal must be dismissed, we forbear to examine any other point in the cause.
¶6*115The circumstance of the sickness of the judge a quo, as detailed in the affidavit of Mr. Farrie, cannot excuse the want of citation in due time, being a writ in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, requiring no special order of the judge. See in support of this opinion, 3 La. Reports 440, 460 and 250. 4 ditto p. 180. and Code of Practice 583.
¶7It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that this appeal be dismissed at the costs of the appellants.
¶8delivered the opinion of the court.
¶9We granted a rehearing on this case to the plaintiffs, on their exhibiting an affidavit of the clerk of the District Court, who stated he had forborne issuing a citation, the defendant and appellee having told him it was unnecessary, and the service of the citation would be acknowledged. This was not admitted by the defendant, and it appears some misunderstanding has taken place.
¶10We are of opinion, that so important a part of the proceedings in an appeal, as the citation of the appellee, cannot be proved as a matter in pais, but must appear as a matter of record, or at least must be established by the written acknowledgment of the party.
¶11Our former opinion must, therefore, remain undisturbed, as the judgment of the court in the present case.