6 Md. App. 523 - Boddie v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Probable cause ... exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer, or of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious person in believing that a felony had been committed by the person arrested. Michaels v. State, 2 Md.App. 424 [ 234 A.2d 772 (1967)]; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md.App. 455 [ 230 A.2d 700 (1967)]. The rule of probable cause is a non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction, but more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion. Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131 [ 220 A.2d 547 (1966)]; Terrell v. State, 3 Md.App. 340 [ 239 A.2d 128 (1968) ]. In other words, an officer is not required to have sufficient evidence to convict at the time of the arrest, but only probable cause or, as stated by the Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 [ 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) ], “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.” In Davis v. United States, supra, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held at page 486 that “the problem faced by the officer is one of probabilities—not certainties and not necessarily eventual truth.” And it is settled that the legality of an arrest is measured by the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest. Mullaney v. State, 5 Md.App. 248 [246 A.2d (1968) ]; Leat”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hamm v. State

2. ““Under the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit of the District of Columbia, a Maryland peace officer is authorized to enter the District while in fresh pursuit to effect an arrest where there is reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony in Maryland. In so acting, the Maryland police officer is vested by Section [901] with the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as a police officer of the District of Columbia would have to make an arrest of a person believed to have committed a felony in the District. In this connection, we note that the law of Maryland and that of the District are virtually identical with respect to the authority of a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest for a felony. Compare Davis v. United States, 230 A. 2d 485 , Curtis v. United States, 222 A. 2d 840 , and Townsley v. United States, 215 A. 2d 482 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals) with Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 38 Md. App. 160 - Hutchinson v. State