6 N.C. App. 66 - State v. Blackmon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

75 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Whether the time elapsed between the theft and the moment when the defendant is found in possession of the stolen goods is too great for the doctrine to apply depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Among the relevant circumstances to be considered is the nature of the particular property involved. Obviously if the stolen article is of a type normally and frequently traded in lawful channels, then only a relatively brief interval of time between the theft and finding a defendant in possession may be sufficient to cause the inference of guilt to fade away entirely. On the other hand, if the stolen article is of a type not normally or frequently traded, then the inference of guilt would survive a longer time interval. In either case the circumstances must be such as to manifest a substantial probability that the stolen goods could only have come into the defendant’s possession by his own act, to exclude the intervening agency of others between the theft and the defendant’s possession, and to give reasonable assurance that possession could not have been obtained unless the defendant was the thief. (Citations omitted.) The question is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. State v. White, 196 N.C. 1 , 144 S.E. 299 .” State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C. App. 66 , 169 S.E. 2d 472 (1969).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hamlet · State v. Parker

2. ““Chief Justice Parker in State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 485 , 151 S.E. 2d 62, 66 , sets out the conditions for application of the doctrine of possession of recently stolen property as follows: ‘ (1) That the property described in the indictment was stolen, the mere fact of finding one man’s property in another man’s possession raising no presumption that the latter stole it; (2) that the property shown to have been possessed by accused was the stolen property; and (3) that the possession was recently after the larceny, since mere possession of stolen property raises no presumption of guilt. (Citing cases).’ If these conditions are met, and where, as in the present case, there is sufficient evidence that the building has been broken into and entered and that property has been stolen therefrom by such breaking and entering, then a presumption of fact arises that the possessor of the stolen property is guilty both of the larceny and of the breaking and entering. State v. Jackson, 274 N.C. 594 , 164 S.E. 2d 369 ; State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258 , 150 S.E. 2d 428 ; State v. Allison, 265 N.C. 512 , 144 S.E. 2d 578 . * * * Where it is shown that a number of articles of property have been stolen at the same time and as a result of the same breaking and entering of the same premises, evidence that a defendant charged with the crimes has possession of one of such articles tends to prove, not only that he stole that particular article, but also that he participated in the breaking and ent”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 14 N.C. App. 373 - State v. Black · State v. Greene

3. ““Motion to nonsuit in a criminal prosecution is properly denied if there is any competent evidence to support the allegations of the warrant or bill of indictment, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference fairly deducible therefrom. If there is more than a scintilla of competent evidence to support the allegations of the warrant or bill of indictment, motion to nonsuit is properly denied. And if there is evidence sufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged or an included crime, motion to nonsuit is properly denied. If there is any evidence tending to prove the fact of guilt or which reasonably conduces to this conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not such as merely raises a suspicion or conjecture of guilt, it is for the jury to say whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the fact of guilt. A like rule applies when the state relies upon circumstantial evidence; in such instance it is for the court to determine whether the circumstantial evidence, either alone or in combination with the direct evidence, provides substantial proof of each essential element of the offense, it being for the jury to determine whether such evidence points unerringly to defendant’s guilt and excludes any other reasonable hypothesis. Decisions to the effect that the court must determine, in passing upon a motion to non-suit, whether the circumstantial evidence excludes”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 15 N.C. App. 296 - State v. McCuien