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6 N.H. 557

Sissons v. Bicknell

Superior Court of New Hampshire

Decided July 15, 1834

Superior Court of New Hampshire · decided 1834-07-15

Assumpsit, for $100, money had and received. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. To this the plaintiffs replied, that, at the time when the cause of action accrued, and ever afterwards, the defendant resided in Vermont, and did not leave property in litis state that could be attached. To this the defendant rejoined, that he left property within the stale, which might have been attached, and upon this issue was joined.

Relies on Ruggles v. Keeler

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1834-07-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently October 1896

4 state decisions

201834184018501860187018801890decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Richardson, C. J,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2*558The statute of limitations provides, that actions on the case should be barred unless commenced within six years next after the cause of action. But the third section declares, that if, at the time the cause of action accrued, or afterwards, the defendant resided without the limits of the state, and did not leave property or estate therein, that could by the common and ordinary process of law be attached, the plaintiff shall be at liberty to commence his action within six years after the cause of action, exclusive of the time during winch the defendant shall have resided without the limits of the state as aforesaid.

¶3It is very obvious, irons the language of the third section, that the statute runs only while the defendant, who is out of the state, has property here, which can be attached .

¶4But it is contended, that, as the defendant was never an inhabitant of this state, the case is riot within the third section of the statute. It is argued that the statute embraces only inhabitants of this state who have gone abroad and left no property, that could be attached. The statute speaks of their leaving property, which certainly gives some countenance to the supposition that the case of inhabitants leaving the state was in the immediate contemplation of those who made the act. But that circumstance is much too slight to sustain a construction so narrow, as that for which the defendant’s counsel contends.

¶5Upon a similar exception in the statute of Massachusetts, it has been decided that the exception embraces those who were never resident in the commonwealth. 7 Mass. Rep. 515, Dwight v. Clark; 11 Pickering, 39—40.

¶6This decision is in strict accordance with other decisions in analogous cases. 17 Mass. Rep. 180, Wilson v. Appleton; 14 ditto, 203, Hall v. Little; 3 Wilson, 145; 2 W. Bl. 723; 3 Johns. 266—267; 10 ditto, 465.

¶7We are, therefore, of opinion that the case is within the meaning of the third section in the statute.

¶8*559It is then clear that this action is not barred by the statute.

¶9The land mortgaged to the defendant may be laid out of the ease, because the interest of a mortgagee in land cannot be attached. 5 N. H. Rep. 430.

¶10And, admitting that oxen and horses, casually in the state, with the defendant, may be considered as property left, within the meaning of the statute, still it does not appear that the defendant has had property in the state, during the term of one year, since the cause of action accrued.

¶11To maintain the issue on his part, it was necessary for the defendant to show, that he had property here that might have been attached during the term of six years after the cause of action accrued, and before the commencement of this suit.

¶12Judgment for the plaintiff.

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