Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

6 N.Y.2d 225

People v. Alfonso

New York Court of Appeals

Decided July 8, 1959

New York Court of Appeals · decided 1959-07-08

Relies on People v. Prosser

Decided 1959-07-08

Desmond, J. (dissenting).

¶1Reversal of this purely discretionary order dismissing an indictment for lack of prosecution is beyond our powers and without precedent in this court. Such dismissals are always considered to be discretionary with the lower courts (see 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 472, subd. b, and, as to similar dismissals of civil causes, see Quick Service Novelty Corp. v. Scharf, 4 N Y 2d 799). In New York State the statute itself makes it so. Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure says: “ If a defendant, indicted for a crime whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found the court may, on application of the defendant, order the indictment to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.”

¶2We may assume that the “ Court [of Appeals] may interfere in the rare situation where there has been an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” (Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, Review in Criminal Cases, p. 745). But if such abuses are theoretically possible, this is certainly not one of them. The first indictment against these defendants had been pending for 21 months and the second for 8 months when dismissal was ordered. In June, 1957, 6 months before the dismissal, these defendants had demanded immediate trial and *230objected to postponement. Again in October, 2 months before dismissal, these defendants had objected to further delay. In November, 1957, in an effort to get immediate trial, they had demanded a severance but this, too, was denied. Of course, in each instance the County Court had some reason or other for the postponement but it is certainly not the job of this court to decide whether they were good reasons. To attempt such a task is to move outside our constitutionally limited jurisdiction to review in criminal cases (N. Y. Const., art. VI, § 7).

¶3The order should be affirmed.

Fuld, J. (dissenting).

¶4I agree with Judge Desmond and add these few additional lines.

¶5The facts of this case are, of course, different from those presented in People v. Prosser (309 N. Y. 353), but the principle there announced requires an affirmance here. “ The inquiry in each case ”, we wrote in Prosser, “ is factual and, like the question whether there has been undue delay, depends ‘ upon the circumstances of each particular case.’ ” (309 N. Y., at p. 360.) Both courts below found as fact that the defendant was deprived of the speedy trial guaranteed to him and, since there is evidence to support that conclusion, this court may not upset it.

¶6What the law condemns is the denial of a speedy trial and, if there be such denial, it matters not that the delay may have been occasioned by adjournments granted by the court rather than by refusal on the part of the prosecutor to bring the defendant to trial. In either case, the impact upon the accused, the harm done to him, is no less because the State action taken was by a judge instead of a prosecutor. (See People v. Prosser, 309 N. Y. 353, 356-357, supra.)

¶7Chief Judge Conway concurs with Judge Van Voobhis ; Judges Fboessel and Bubke concur in result; Judge Desmond dissents in an opinion in which Judge Dye concurs and Judge Fuld dissents in a separate opinion.

¶8Orders reversed, etc.

/6/ny2d/225 · .json · Public domain