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← 6 NY2D 97 - Gair v. Peck

Gair v. Peck’s Empirical Analysis

1959

Citation profile

122
cited by 122 later decisions
11
states following
December 2011
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 3 district · 39 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 122 later decisions — most recently December 2011 · most notably State v. Bailey (1988), Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co. (1969)

25 federal appellate · 3 district · 39 state decisions — followed in 11 states

4201959196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Carolene Products Co. · Carter v. Carter Coal Co. · Iselin v. United States · Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. · People v. Friedman

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 122 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Rule 4 here fails to take into account, at the very beginning, that the case may be tried and retried, that appeals may be taken, before a judgment may be collected. And in some instances, after all these services have been rendered, there is no money judgment for the plaintiff. These are the hazards which an attorney assumes when he accepts a client on a contingent fee basis. How can a court be so omniscient to state that, at the outset, before the greater part of the work has been done, that a particular percentage is unreasonable under any and all circumstances? Under some circumstances, it is quite conceivable that a contingent retainer fee of 33 1/3 of the recovery may be unreasonable. It may very well be that fees in excess thereof should be the exception rather than the rule. But the reasonableness of the fee — regardless of the percentage chosen — can only be determined in an ad hoc proceeding, after the event." * * * * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “[I]n recent years contingent fee agreements have been filed with the Clerk of the First Department at an annual rate of 150,000 or more, of which upwards of 60% have fixed the attorneys' compensation at 50% of the amount of the recovery. Ninety-five percent of the actions brought have been settled, and not more than one and one-half percent of all claims of this nature have gone to judgment after trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “"Why, for instance, is a contingent fee of 33 1/3 % of the recovery fair and conscionable under all the circumstances, but a contingent fee of 34% unfair and unconscionable under all the circumstances? The reasonableness of the fee is not determined solely on the amount charged, but also by the quality of the services rendered in light of the circumstances of the particular case." [Citations omitted].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.