6 Or. App. 378 - State v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Traditionally, forcible entry has been allowed where `exigent circumstances' exist to justify the exception. * * * Therefore, where notice would imperil the officer, * * * the requirement is dispensed with. "* * * * * "The officers' on-the-spot decision is of necessity a hasty judgment based upon the facts — or reasonably founded suspicion — of the moment. Severe judicial second-guessing is therefore inappropriate. The officer must be given a degree of latitude for good faith judgment as to his own possible peril, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F2d 923 (9th Cir 1966), or as to the possibility for destruction of the evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of crime for which he is obliged to search. If the decision is reasonable under the `exigent circumstances,' the entry is valid. "* * * * * "In State v. Steffes, supra , we cited [ People v. Maddox, supra , ] with approval and described its holding for excused compliance with `knock and announce' when (1) the police possess information which would lead them to reasonably believe the evidence would be destroyed, or (2) reasonably believe a culprit might escape, or (3) reasonably believe the police might face increased peril. "What constitutes `exigent circumstances' is discussed in more detail, and we think well stated, in State v. Clarke et al, Case No 70-382 (DCA, Fla, filed July 1970). These, stated in substance, are: "(1) Where the person within already knows of the officer's authority and purpose; (2) where the office”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Ford

2. “It must be borne in mind that the primary purpose of the constitutional guarantees is to prevent unreasonable invasions of the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, and when an officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to make an arrest and as an incident to that arrest is authorized to make a reasonable search, his entry and his search are not unreasonable. * * * Moreover, since the demand and explanation requirements of section 844 are a codification of the common law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limited by the common law rules that compliance is not required if the officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 ; see Restatement, Torts, § 206, comment d. Without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide these questions in the first instance.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Ford

3. “The officers' on-the-spot decision is of necessity a hasty judgment based upon the facts — or reasonably founded suspicion — of the moment. Severe judicial second-guessing is therefore inappropriate. The officer must be given a degree of latitude for good faith judgment as to his own possible peril, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F2d 923 (9th Cir 1966), or as to the possibility for destruction of the evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of crime for which he is obliged to search. If the decision is reasonable under the `exigent circumstances,' the entry is valid.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Ford