Volume 6 — South Carolina Law Reports

<p>Edwin Gardner 0n simp' v°¿s^n ^London, payable to one Bell. The bill was the property of the plaintiff, and was dishon-oured when presented for acceptance. Evidence was given that defendant wrote to Edwin Gardner, that he had paid the bill; which letter E G. showed to the plaintiff, to convince her that the bill was taken up. In that belief she rested satisfied, until the protest of the bill for non-payment; soon after which E. G. failed.</p> <p>An action of deceit was brought against defendant, to make him answerable to the amount of the bill, for falsely representing that he had paid the bill, and-thereby defrauding the plaintiff, by lulling her into security, and preventing her from proceeding against E. G. Plaintiff had a verdict for the amount of the bill; but the same was set aside, and a new trial granted.</p> <p>In an action of deceit, there must be such a connection between the party doing the act, and the party that suffers by it, as to show that the injury is within the scope of the fraud intended : The ground of the action is fraud,</p>

CHARLESTON; January Term, 1812. Special action on the case, originally tried before Judge Trezev ant, when a verdict was found for the defendant j the plaintiff then obtained a new trial, on which a verdict was found for the plaintiff, In the month of October, 1804, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant, one thousand pieces of bri-tannias, to he shipped in the brig Fame, commanded and owned by defendant, to the port of Cape Francois, with instructions immediately to…

<p>words w-dem-^,e’ex. pressions thelenfe ™“gre altered— to Prevent the recov-¿¿mages,</p>

<p>Charleston, January Term, 1812.</p> <p>Motion to set aside a prohibition, January Term, 1809.</p> <p>The City Council laid a pavement in Meeting-street, and to defray the expenses, assessed the owners l°ts fronting on the street. The respondent, for l0t 0n the east side of Meeting-street, was assessed m the sum of three hundred and two dollars twenty eight-cents, which, having neglected to pay, a warrant of distress was issued, against his property.</p> <p>On the 14th of March, 1809, the respondent obtained of -the Common Pleas a prohibition. The grounds of the suggestion were : 1st, that the City Council, contrary.to law, delegated their power, as Commissioners, to certain persons who laid the said pavement, made the assessment and issued the warrant : 2nd, That this respondent, before thi s assessment, had paid for the same lot which runs to Church-street, a drain and pavement assessment amounting to two hundred and iifty-one dollars, and ought not to be made to pay for two pavements for one lot: 3rd, That pavements are a general benefit and should be paid for by a general tax: 4th, That the respondent should have been summoned by the City Council, to shew cause against their assessment, and to answer their demand: 5th, That the City Court had jurisdiction only to §100 ; the corporation cannot, therefore, assess and levy a greater sum : 6th, That the City Council cannot impose a greater fine than one hundred dollars, and cannot, thorefore, assess §302,28.</p> <p>The City Council contend that the prohibition ought to be set aside, because, by the act of incorporation, they are invested with the powers of the Commissioners of the Streets, as expressed in the act of Assembly, 1764. That in their corporate capacity, they directed the said pavement to be laid, made the assessment, and issued the warrant. That ^ie S>rouilds taken in the suggestion, are insufficient to SUStain it.</p> <p>By an act of Assembly, passed in 1764,(a) enti-tied “ an act to empower certain commissioners to keep clean, and in good order and repair, the streets in Charleston power to assess the inhabitants, is given to the said commissioners, with this condition, (( and in case after the said commissioners, or a majority of them, shall have made such assessment, and given ten days notice thereof, by hanging up their assessment in some public part of the town,” &c. &c. which said act was revived by an act, passed in 1783: in which year, the powers of the Commissioners of the Streets, were vested in the City Council ;(b) who, by their ordinance of 1806, sec. 11.(c) appoint Commissioners, by the name of the Commissioners of the Streets, and authorise them to make assessments; and al 1 such assessments shall be made out in the manner aforesaid, by direction of the Commissioners of the Streets and Lamps; and, after being approved by them, and by the City Council, shall be lodged in the hands of the City Treasurer, who shall collect the amount thereof, in the manner in which the city taxes are collected, giving twenty days notice to the party assessed.</p> <p>Colcock, J. As to the first ground, stated in the suggestion, it does not appear to me that it can he said, that the City Council have delegated their power; for it will he observed, that the assessments, although made by the Commissioners in the first instance, are to be submitted to the consideration of the Council, and are not to be acted upon, until approved by them ; so that I should consider the commissioners only as officers, or agents, appointed to ascertain data, on which the assessment is to be founded ; and this power of appointing officers, or agents, to assist in the discharge of the multifarious duties which devolve on the City Council, is not only incident to corporations, but is expressly given to them by the 4th section of the act of incorporation. (Public Laws, pi 329.)</p> <p>As to the second ground, from the wording of the act of 1764, I am of opinion, that the City Council may legally assess the owners of a lot, which bounds on two streets for two pavements, but whether the sum levied in this, case is agreeable to law, and the value of the hpuse, I cannot decide, unless the assessment of the whole town or square, was laid before me.</p> <p>What is stated as a third ground in the suggestion, might be urged against the existence of such a law, but cannot weigh with me, whose duty it is, to state what the law is, not what it should be.</p> <p>The fourth ground, is, in my judgment, the nivot on which the case turns. The City Council claim the right to make the assessment, under that part of the act of incorporation, (a) which vested in them the powei’s of the Commissioners of Streets, as given by the act of 1764 ;(b) and I have no doubt but they have departed from the spirit, as well as the letter of that act. It certainly must he considered as an exercise of arbitrary power, and wholly inconsistent with the principles of our government, that a' tax should be exacted from any person, without giving any notice of the reasons for laying it, or the principles on which it is levied. The act, from Which the power is derived, expressly guards against this, by requiring that the assessment should be made known, by being hung up in some public part of the town, (a mode of publication, which was perhaps at that time a proper one,) for ten days. Now, the ordinance of the City Council only requires that the assessment which is made, is to be given to the officer, who is to give the party, twenty days notice that he is assessed in such a sum; and no means afforded him, as was unquestionably intended by the act of 1764, to ascertain the justice of the assessment, or to oppose its injustice, if any there should be. This might be done, by passing an ordinance, stating the principle oi\ which the assessment is made, the value of each house, and the sum in which each individual is assessed, which should go into operation at some future period; allowing such time as would enable those to be affected by it, to make such opposition as they might deem proper.</p> <p>Assessments never should he resorted to, if they ' # 0 can be avoided; for, with all the guards which can he placed upon them by the law, there will, at least in some degree, be the exercise of an arbitrary power. It is, therefore, the duty of this court, to see that the assessments made by the City Council, are in strict conformity with those guards, which have been placed upon the exercise of this power. It appears to me, that they have not given that public notice of the assessment, which was intended by the •act of 1764, and which justice requires.</p> <p>As to the 5th and 6th grounds, the powers of the City Council, and those of the City Court are very distinct. There is no limit to the power of the former in assessment; and the latter has nothing to do with the case : for the law directs the assessments to be recovered by warrant. I am, therefore, of opinion that the motion be rejected.</p>

CHARLESTON, January Term, 1812. Colcock, J. In January Term, 1809, the jury summoned in pursuance of the Escheat act, and of the act to authorise the city council to appoint an escheator, found that Henry Osborne, late of Charleston, was hy birth a subject of the king of Great Britain; that he became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1789; that he purchased in fee a of land in St. Philip’s Parish, from an American, in the year 1793 ; that he continued in…

CHARLESTON, January Term, 1812. -Nott, J. These were two actions brought by way of summary process, for two quarters’ hire of a negro, at the rate of one hundred dollars per year.

Charleston, January Term, 1812. This was an action to recover the price of a young female slave, upon the ground of a failure in the warranty of soundness. The plaintiff produced the advertisement, under which this slave, together with several others, was advertised to be sold, all of ' whom were described as prime negroes.

<p>s. n. em-thifcap-^ ^“o* 5)uild a boat, completed and the same £id¿har£ed ti!e pnce uj their ac-the ship*, er-Tofthe" v|s?ei fiv-cim-ies-the’con-en them aster: the buiid-gain2t the master or owner.</p>

<p>Charleston, January Term, 1812.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. This was an action to recover a moiety of 100 acres, originally granted to to Anthony Slack. — A. by bis last will, in 1761, devised the 100 acres to his wife and three daughters, and their heirs. ° The widow and three daughters occupied the land after his death: afterwards the widow died intestate: then one of the daughters died an infant and unmarried.

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Assumpsit for overseer’s wages. The declaration contained two counts. Indebitatus .assumpsit, f°r Work and labour; and Quantum meruit. The defendant by his plea set forth a special agreement J r . to allow the plaintiff, one eighth of the crop m consideration of Ms services; and averred that plaintiff had violated the agreement by negligence and absenting himself without proper canse, .and concluded to the country.

<p>verdict by suv-aside'Set</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Action on the case for speaking certain false and slanderous words of the plaintiff’s wife. The words laid were for calling plaintiff’s wife a whore ; no special damage was laid ; and the non-suit was ordered on the ground, that the declaration contained „ ,. no cause of action.

Columbia; November Term, IBIS. Brevard, J. This was an action of trespass guare clausum fregit. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The statute of limitations, and a former recovery for the ' same trespass. The case was tried before me, March Term, 1810, at Sumter. The plaintiff produced in evidence, the record of a judgment in the same court) obtained by her against one John Murray, defendant’s tenant, for a tract of land called a Dry Swamp,” and ten dollars damages.

COLUMBIA JVbvember Term 1812. Colonel William Thomson by his last will in 1796 duly executed devises as follows.

<p>Columbia, November Term, 1812.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Trespass quare clausum fregit, tried at Fairfield, April, 1811, for cutting a road through the plaintiff’s land.

Columbia, November Term, 1812. This was an action of trespass to try title, tried before Judge Smith, at Abbeville. The plaintiff produced a conveyance of the land in dispute from defendant, to one William Gordon, his son; and another conveyance from William Gordon to him, (the plaintiff.) Defendant then proved by the declarations of William Gordon, that he, William Gordon was an alien: on which his Honour non-suited the plaintiff. Motion to set aside the non-suit.

Columbia, November' Term, 1812'. Nott, J. The question is, whether the statute of limitations will bar dower. The words of our act are “ If any person to whom any right or title to lands. tenements or hereditaments shall descend or come, do not prosecute the same within five years-after such right or title averred, then he, she or they, shall be forever barred to recover the same.” These words embrace a right to dower as well as any other right to lands or hereditaments.

Columbia, November Term, 18X2. . 1 respass to try title. The grant was to John Loumber / and the plaintiff claimed under a conveyance from John Lumbus or Lumbers.- The presiding Judge being of opinion that there was no derivation of title, non-suited the plaintiff. Motion to reverse the non-suit.

<p>No indict-lie undei^ Assembly, foi- marif-’ The fac° of marking-idenctf to" indictment for disñg-S'</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Motion to reverse a judgment on demurrer, to an action of covenant on indenture of apprenticeship.

Columbia, November Term, 1812. This was a rule upon the sheriff of Kershaw District, to shew cause why he should not pay over to Edward Watson, the sum of two hundred dollars ; being the amount of rent due to him from John Hudson, on the following statement.

Columbia, November Term, 1812, The motion m this case was submitted without t • , i • • oi - - garment. It is to reverse the decision or the court of Common Pleas for Abbeville District, on á question of costs. The action’ was assumpsit; and the plaintiff, by several counts in the declaration, stated * .... „ several distinct causes of action, one of which was a promise to pay fifty-five dollars 5 and was the only count supported by evidence.

Columbia, November Term, 1812. It appeared that the son of the defendant, as the agent of his father, had aided in removing a major Ming from Virginia, on a consideration that he was to be loaded back to Virginia with cotton.

Columbia, November Term, 1812, This was an action of debt, brought on an injunction bond, the condition of which was, that the defendant, Andrew Torrance should prosecute his bill of injunction to effect; or, in case, of failure, be answerable for, and abide by, the award of the Court of Equity. The defendant after praying oyer, and settinS 0U^ condition of the bond, pleaded performance generally, without shewing in what manner he had performed.

<p>a jaiioi-% £5^”°*</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. The grounds for a new trial in this case were, 1st, Because the judge permitted affidavits,taken ex parte to prove the infirmity of a witness, examined de be-ne esse. 2dly, Because the court permitted the examination of Daniel McKie, to be given in evidence, when it was proved by Mrs. Sims, that he had i * ' sold the land, and her husband, from whom the defendant derived his title, had paid him for it, though she did not know that he had made a…

<p>The maxim nul lum tem-pus occu-sit Regí applies to ^ he to lands can be acquired a-ftatef by16 Citations In cases of for want 'the16 freehold is vested in the state from the time of the-death; and no office iff necessary. The statue of limitations cannot bar an escheat or give a right to escheated property.</p> <p>N. B. No other opinions are on record, in this case: but in a. note to Judge revanl’s MS. Reports, he says, The Court unanimously granted the motion.” Note by McCord,</p>

<p>Columbia, November Term, 1812.</p> <p>Court o? Appeals Columbia May, 1812. Tried before Ms honor Judge Waties. Verdict for the plaintiff,</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Action for discharging a prisoner without taking sufficient security, under the act commonly called ^le Pr^son bounds act. The prisoner had escaped, and upon a statement of facts, the only question was, r # 7 J * 7 whether the sheriff was liable, if the securities were sufficient at the time they were taken, and became insolvent afterwards.

<p>Columbia? November Term? 1812.</p> <p>Court of Appeals? Columbia. This motion is to-set aside a non-suit ordered by the district court of Orangeburgh? on the ground of a failure of necessary evidence to maintain the action. The action was trover? and conversion of a negro slave.</p> <p>The plaintiffs’ claim was founded on an instrument of r _ . . „ , , writing, containing a conditional contract of sale, by the owner of the slave, Snell, i o the plaintiff, by way of mortgage, to secure the payment of a sum of money lent by the plaintiff to Snell. By the terms of the contract, the slave was to remain in Snell’s possession until the day of payment, when, if the money was not paid, with interest, it should be lawful for the plaintiff to take possession of, and sell the slave' in satisfaction of the debt: but if the debt was satisfied at the day, the sale should be void. The writing was not sealed, but only signed by Snell. It was stated that the debt was unsatisfied after the day appointed for the payment thereof ’, and the plaintiff contends that by the legal operation of the contract, the mortgagee became proprietor of the slave, liable to the equity of redemption. Upon this statement, the papers was offered in evidence, to prove property in the plaintiff, and was rejected by the district court; in consequence of which the non-suit was ordered.</p> <p>Nott, J. This was an action of trover, to re-@over a negro slave, tried before judge Smith, at Orangeburgh. The plaintiff had taken a mortgage of the negro in question, from one Snell, redeemable upon the payment of a certain sum of money, on a, future day. Snell continued in the possession of the negro, and previous to the day of payment, sold him to the defendant.</p> <p>The presiding judge granted a non-suit? oii the ground that the mortgage did not vest such a legal right in the plaintiff as entitled him to maintain this action. I am? however? of opinionthat such a right did vest in him? and therefore the non-suit ought to he set aside. Every mortgage? prima facie? conveys a legal right to become void? on a condition subsequent? which it is incumbent on the mortgagor to prove. Whether the want of delivery, or any circumstances attending the transaction, afforded such presumption? or evidence of fraud? as would prevent the plaintiff front recovering on the merits? should have been submitted to the jury? but could not have been taken advantage of by way of non-suit. The motion? therefore? ought to be granted;</p> <p>CoLCodc? J. On the argument of this case? I was inclined to think that the opinion of the court below was correct? and that the mortgage should not have been given in evidence. But? On further consideration? I am induced to think a mortgagee? may maintain his action of trover against a third person. In England? the mortgagee may maintain his action even against the mortgagor; Douglas, 22. Kuch vs. Hall, 1 Term Rep. 382 — 3. Birch vs. Wright. and after the stat.4th of Jinn, which- does away the necessity of attornment? he may maintain his action or distrain for rent against a tenant? Douglas 279. Moss vs. Gallimore. But by our act of assembly the right of the mortgagee to maintain eject-* . , • . i ,7 -r, ment against the mortgagor is taken away. 1 vol. Jr. 65. Jt appears to me, if this remedy is not given, that the mortgages of personal property would be wholly ineffectual. In the case of Atkinson vs. Maling and others, (2 Term. Rep. 462.) the ship, which was recovered by the plaintiff, was ait sea when mortgaged, and, of course, no delivery could be made. It seems to be conceded, that the mortgagee is considered as being in possession, from the execution and delivery of the mortgage, in the same manner that the assigns of a bankrupt are considered to be in possession of the goods of the bankrupt as-signee, and may maintain trover for the recovery of them. 7 Term Rep. 312. The mortgagee is the absolute and true owner. 3 Cranch. p. 140 — 4. and 1 Vez. Ryall vs. Rowles. I am upon these authorities, and for these reasons, of opinion that the motion be granted.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. This motion is to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Fairfield, on demurrer. The action was debt, on a bond, by which William Watr son, and Jas. Alex.

<p>A pur. chaser of sheriff’s action toan those lands from a third person, must show a ti-tie in the person against whom the execution issued. ió ™aesesUof ■ fiscatedes" tates. Bod den and Mitchell purchaser6 mortgag ed to the dmm'oL6 not'recov-1 shewing Ut title in the mortgager</p>

<p>Columbia, November Term, 1812.</p> <p>Motion to reverse decision, and to set aside a writ of mandamus.</p> <p>Tried before his honour, Judge Smith. In this case a suggestion was filed by the plaintiff to obtain a writ of mandamus against the defendants, requiring them to return Nathan Hanks duly elected sheriff of Darlington District. The facts charged in the suggestion, were, that the said managers, on the Thursday next,after the said election, attended at Dar lington court-house, and after counting the votes given at the election, found, and declared that Nathan Hanks was elected, by a majority of forty-seven votes. The answer of three of the defendants, which the other three concurred in, to the best of their knowledge, admitted there were forty seven votes in favour of Nathan Hanks, and proclaimed the same; but did not declare Hanks duly elected, because John Me JRa, the other candidate, served them with a notice that he intended to contest the election, and set forth his grounds</p> <p>Upon the trial of the sSid election, the said man* agers presided, and after full investigation, they de-dared void forty-seven of Hanks’ votes, which left the votes of each candidate equal, and the said managers certified to the governor, that the election was void, ánd the governor appointed the said John Me Ra. It was also proven to the managers, that but one of the said managers appointed to hold the poll at Darlington court-house attended and received the votes, and that only three of the six managers appointed to hold the said 'election, attended at the counting of the votes. His Honor decided that the grounds upon which a number of the said votes in favour of Hanks had been rejected as bad, were in-' sufficient, and it then appeared that the said Nathan Hanks had a majority in his favour.</p> <p>The defendants showed cause why the writ of mandamus should not issue.</p> <p>1st, That this court had no jurisdiction, because the legislature has given the managers a judicial, and discretionary power to judge of, and determine contested elections for sheriffs, without making them liable to the controul of any other tribunal.</p> <p>2d, That having fulfilled the duties of their appointment, and made a determination thereof, according to their best judgment, their duties and office were then at an end.</p> <p>3d, That this court has not any power to compel them to decide, according to any judgment but their ©wfi; nor to pronounce a new judgment, after they had decided the case and given judgment.</p> <p>4th, The party had another pealing to a writ of mandamus. remedy besides ap-</p> <p>5th. The office being not vacant, the officers had no right to act. r</p> <p>6th, That all the votes taken at the poll, holden at Darlington court-house, which amounted to a greater number that Hank’s majority, were void: because the said votes were taken by only one manager, to witGeorge Bruce: although two were appointed jointly, and commissioned by the governor for that purpose; the other manager being absent the whole time.</p> <p>7th, Because but three, of the six managers ap*.. pointed, met at the place specified by law to count the votes, &c. the other three were absent the whole time.</p> <p>8th, Because a writ of mandamus could not is-" sue against them, inasmuch as their office was a voluntary one, which they had a right to refuse the acceptance of, and a portion had a right to decline acting on, when they choose.</p> <p>His Honor, overruled the defendants, on each of these grounds, and ordered a writs of mandamu to'issue against the said managers, requiring them to certify the said M%than Hanks, duly elected sheriff of Darlington district. The defendants now moved that the decision of his Honor be reversed, and the writ of mandamus set aside, on the ground that he mistook the laws, and gave judgment contrary to law and evidence.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Motion to reverse the decision, on demurrer. Tried before his honour Judge Brevard. This was a special action on the case. The declaration alledged, that the plaintiff had a judgment, an(l capias ad satisfaciendum, against James Bar-win, Jun. upon which ca. sa. he was in custody.

<p>Columbia, November Term, 1812.</p> <p>Motion to reverse the decision of the Court of Common pleas, for Sumter district, held by Justice Waties.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Motion in arrest of judgment; and for a new trial, Tried before his Honor Judge Brevard. The defendant was indicted for perjury, commit-on a trial? had before Leonard Jldcock, esquire. In this case, Leonard Jldcoch was called and sworn as a witness, who deposed that he granted the summons, but refused to have it returned before him, for to sit on the trial of the case, as he had non-suited the plaintiff in a former trial.

Columbia, November Term, ,1812. Judge, Trcver, Motion to reverse the decision of the Samuel Farrow, esquire sitting as- Judge. This was an action of trover brought by the plain-^-ffagainst the defendant, to recover a negro woman. The defendant pleaded the statute of limita- • tions.

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Special action for an escape. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, for the voluntary escape of J. M. Gallagher, who was in goal, by the surrender of special bail, at the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff proved that the sheriff turned the debtor out of goal, because the plaintiff did not give security for the cos-s °f feeding him when in goal.

Columbia, November Term, 1812. This was an action on the case, for procuring, persuading, and enticing a negro slave to depart and absent himself from the service of his master.

<p>The affi-aavit or defendant inafols™" absence'18 *om material is no S’ postpone0 a trial.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812. Case from Pendleton Dist. Nov. 1812. Motion to reverse a decree on Sum. Pro. on a note of hand given for a hogshead of tobacco; weight, 1200 lbs. at S3 per cwt. say, S36. On this note there was a memorandum, that the defendant should take it at his own risque. The defendant, after the tobacco was delivered, sent it to Charleston, where it turned out good for nothing.

<p>Columbia, November Term, 1812.</p> <p>Indictment for murder. Verdict guilty.</p>

<p>Columbia, November Term, 1812.</p> <p>Indictment for murder.</p>

Columbia, November Term, 1812, This is a motion to reverse the decision of Mr. Justice Bay, in the Court of General Sessions, held for the district of Laurens, and to order the defendant to be liberated upon bail.

<p>Charleston, January Term, 1813.</p>

<p>Charleston, January Term, 1813.</p> <p>Motion for a new trial.</p> <p>Tried before his honour Judge Grimke.</p>

<p>CHARLESTON, January Term, 1813.</p> <p>Forcible Entry and Detainer v In Circuit Court at Charleston, before his Honour Judge Nott.</p>

CharlestoN, January Term, 18Í3. Trespass to try title. This was an action of trespass to try title to acres of marsh land on James’ Island. Title being the issue, there was no question about the trespass.

'Charleston, January Term, 1813. This was an action to recover á general average loss on a policy of insurance under-written by the defendants.

CharlestoN, May Term, 1813. Motion for a new trial. The defendant in this case was found guilty of t carnal knowledge of an infant, under the age or ten years, contrary to the statute. The material witner. was chüd, an infant little more than seven years 0](] at the time the charge is laid.

CHARLESTON, May Term, 1813. Assumpsit on a policy of insurance. The brie ■ John, commanded by captain Joseph , . 1 , . , , Hudson, was insured, together with her cargo or freight, $2,500, at 7 per cent, on the 25th April, 1^06, by the plaintiff, on a voyage from Charleston, to St. Domingo. She sailed from the port of Charleston on the 30th of April, 1806, on her said voyage.

CharlestoN, May Term, 1813, Colcock, J. A motion for a new trial is made in this case, on the following grounds, viz. 1st, That the plaintiff’s case rested upon the uncorrob-orate As to the first ground it depends altogether on facts, which it is the province of the jury to decide, and on which, in my judgment, they have correctly decided.

Charleston, May Term, 1813. Actions of Assumpsit upon three policies.

<p>o" íond the defen-idiscmmt c»i serví-" ces rend-year to yQvxre. thTdlfijn-to hweSht theamount Ldbnui-hhnís 1° payment, pro tanto, from time whenthe due • 'orie whether they are to be treated count only against the amount of principal and inter-tereat at tha trial.</p>

<p>lnVr92 the defend of the. g celeste® for £603. had been *223 was time of tract,°due on ®fid Defendant paid £380 in money, f"rdtfeVe" ^edfoi’ lowing ac. mentf‘a paymcoi!° ^at^he owestothe , , , for paper medium borrowed on the mortgage of a plantation on Charleston “ neck, called Paradise, this day bought by me; the sum supposed to be about 223 pounds ■” signed D. B. The plaintiff, afterwards, without suit being brought, voluntarily paid off the loan-office bond, from an apprehension that he would eventually be compelled to do so j and then brought this action to re-Rover what he had so paid. Held that he could not recover.</p>

<p>Charleston, April Term, 1813.</p>

Columbia, April Term, 1813, Case from Laurens District. Constitutional Court of Appeals, Nov. 1812, Assumpsit on an open account.

Columbia, April Term, 1813. Fi. Fa. in Assumpsit. k This was a rule against the sheriff, to compel him to pay over monies which he had collected, belong-ins: to the defendant; to which the sheriff made a . . special return. That he had monies m his hands, ^0, ^ut in his office also, an execution of «/?„ Blanding & Co. against Ulysses Rogers.

<p>Columbia, April Term,, 1813»</p> <p>Motion for a new trial.</p>

Columbia, April Term, 1813; The plaintiff in this case, being a man of a weak , -i*, mind, made an agreement with the defendant to serve him a yeai for his food and clothes. His father Save notice to the defendant, that if he kept him he must pay at the rate of five dollars per month for his service. Defendant then desired him to go away hut he refused to go.

Columbia, Jlpril Term, 1813, The defendant, Moore, had purchased a judgment from Justin Smith, against James Monk; and the defendant, Moore, had bound himself to pay thé sheriff’s fees, without saying what fees. On this judgment a ca. sa. issued, and Monk was imprisoned under it for á considerable time.

Columbia, April Term, 1813. Tried before J udge Brevard. This was a special action on the case against John Clarke, as sheriff of Laurens district, to recover 7 7 damages for permitting William Prather, who was . , . „ , m the custody of the sheriff, by virtue of an attachment, issued from the Court of Equity, fora contempt, in not giving security to perform the decree of the said court, in the case of Jennet Prather, by her next friend, Jacob Miller, against-the said…

Columbia, April Term, 1813. Application for a writ of partition. After this case had been some time at issue, the defendant’s counsel moved for leave to withdraw all his pleas, and plead a release, puis dariein continuance, which was granted and the plea filed. The next court, the plaintiff’s counsel moved to strike out that plea as frivolous, because it was not supported by affidavit.

Columbia, JYovebiber 'term, 1813. Casé from Green Ville district. Constitutional Court of Appeals, November; 1814: Motion to reverse judgment for defendant in demurrer. The plaintiff in this case brought his action of debt on an exemplification of a judgment from North-Carolina.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. Debt on bond. The plaintiff declared, in the usual form, on the penalty of the bond. The defendant craved oyer of the condition, which being set out, it appeared to be a bond taken, (or rather pretended to be taken,) according to the provisions of the act for the maintenance of illegitimate children. The defendant demurred generally. The demurrer being overruled by the court below, ,a motion is now made to reverse that decision.

<p>Columbia, November Term, .1814.</p> <p>Constitutional Court of Appeals. Dec. 1815.</p> <p>Motion to set aside a decree on Sum. pro. &c.</p>

Columbia^ November Term, 1814. Tried before Judge VFaties. This was an action of debt, on the sheriff’s bond, given by the defendant, as sheriff of Fairfield district. The defendant pleaded non est factum, and objected to the admission of the certified copy of the bond, under the plea 5 because the words u as required, by law,” instead of the words ( The present motion, is to reverse that decision.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. This was an attachment taken from a justice'of the peace, on an affidavit by the plaintiff that the defendant had enticed away his slave, of the value of $5450. The presiding judge (Nott) reversed the judgment in this case, on the ground that no , . . . „ „ , attachment could issue from a justice of peace but on contract. This motion is to reverse that decision. ,

<p>An infant may disavow, in ways, Sjiis ofcanyhig-into effect a contract made during' infancy. He uponTands sold oi> conveyed by him when under age. He may, when he comes of age, con-same lands to another. He may leave the service of one to whom he was bound and enter into the service d' another.</p>

Columbia, November'Perm. 1814. Assumpsit on a judgment and issue on non-assumpsit. from North-Carolina ; 7 On production of the record, there appeared to have been a verdict only, and no judgment. The presiding Judge granted a non-suit. A motion is now made to set aside that non-suit.

Charleston, November Term, 1814, The defendant Was the owner of a certain negro slave, who had committed some crime in Barnwell district; and he had been arrested at the instance Of the plaintiff, to answer for this offence. The negro escaped, and got into Charleston, where he was apprehended and committed to the work-house.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. The plaintiffs h;id commenced a large number of actions of trespass to try titles, and Hugh Morrow been nominated surveyor on the part of the seveial defendants. The plaintiffs had discontinued their suits: and for the surveyor, tlie clerk had . . taxed costs in each case for his services as surveyor, and for each day that, he had attended court, altbough he had attended without any subpoena.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. This was an action of trespass, de bonis asportatio. To this, the defendant pleaded a plea of justification? under the judgment of a justice of the peace. And » the only question was, whether a justice ot the peace had jurisdiction of unliquidated demands above three pounds Sterling ? The presiding judge {-Nott) decided that a single justice had jurisdiction as far as twenty dollars.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. Two questions were made in this case: 1st, Whether a defendant in a Sum. Pro. can avail himself of a set off, by way of defence which is over the summary jurisdiction of the court? 2nd, If he cannot y whether he can at the trial relinquish a part of his demand, so as to reduce it within the summary jurisdiction.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. This was an action of trespass to try title. The land was sold under execution by the sheriff of Spar-tanburgh, as the property of Thomas Leatherwood, and bought by the plaintiff. The defence set Up, was, that Leatherwood had surrendered Up all his property, of which this land was a part; and assigned it over to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, according to the provisions of the act for the relief of insolvent debtors.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. Motion in arrest of judgment, for non-suit, or new trial. Tried before Judge Smiths This was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover the amount of two promissory notes. The writ and declaration were for a demand of John Bowie against the defendant, and stated the notes to have been given to John Bowie. To this declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue, the statute, and a set-off.

Columbia, November Term, 1814. Case from Abbeville district. Constitutional Court of Appeals, Nov. 1814, Motion to reverse the decisions of the Circuit Court. This was an action of debt, on a bond given by the defendant and two others; to which the defend-pleatled in abatement, that the bond was a joint k°n(lj ami not joint and several; and that, therefore, all the obligors ought to have been sued.

Columbia, November Term. 1814. This action was brought to try the right of Jane-Heard to a certain negro, (Hose.) Her claim was founded on a marriage contract entered into before marriage. John Heard agreed, in consideration of a marriage to take place between him and Jane Bernard, to make over to her, among other things^ the negro in question: and the writing was signed by both.