Jenkins v. Hale’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
7 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Angie Chesser v. Amos Sparks · 792 So. 2d 392 - Ex Parte Cranman · McDowell v. Brown · Nance by and Through Nance v. Matthews · Brown v. Crawford
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ ‘The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy. Ex parte Mobile Fixture & Equip. Co., 630 So.2d 358, 360 (Ala.1993). Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform, accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the Court. See Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.2002).’ “Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d [498,] at 499 [ (Ala.2005) ]. ‘ “[I]f an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, such a case ‘presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent.’ ” ’ Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499 (quoting Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142-43 (Ala.2002)). ‘ “Therefore, a court’s failure to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity may properly be addressed by a petition for the writ of mandamus.” ’ Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499-500 (quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health & Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 810-11 (Ala.2002)).””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Irvin v. Shelley““ “Whether [§ 14] immunity serves as a defense to an action against a state officer or employee sued in his individual capacity depends upon the degree to which the action involves a State interest.... “ ‘When determining whether a State interest in an action against a state official or employee in his or her individual capacity is sufficient to trigger the immunity granted by § 14, our cases distinguish between the standards applied to those state agents or employees whose positions exist by virtue of legislative pronouncement and those who serve as the constitutional officers of this State. We have held that State-agent immunity may bar an action against a state agent or employee under the principles announced in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000). See Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000) (adopting, by majority, the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity). However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer’s individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer’s employment.’ ””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Suttles v. Roy““Jenkins was required to plead that Sheriff Hale’s ‘improper “custom or policy ... resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights[.]” ’ Hartley [v. Parnell], 193 F.3d [1263,] 1269 [(11th Cir.1999) ]. In her complaint, Jenkins alleges that ‘[Sheriff Hale] ... had policies and/or customs in place that caused medical treatment to be denied to inmates of the County Jail’ and that ‘the failure of [Sheriff Hale] ... to correct these policies and/or customs ... enabled Sheriffs Deputies, jail personnel and/or medical personnel to deprive Hodge ... of [her] constitutional rights.’ Jenkins’s brief, Exhibit B. Jenkins’s ‘complaint allege[s] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.’ Ex parte Alabama Department of Youth Services, 880 So.2d at 402 . Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, Sheriff Hale is not entitled to a dismissal of Jenkins’s § 1983 claim against him based on qualified immunity and, thus, is not entitled to mandamus relief on this issue.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.