Berman v. Commissioner

¶2Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion

¶3In this case the respondent determined a deficiency of $3,226.56 in income and victory tax for 1943. The computation of the deficiency involves income of both 1942 and 1943, pursuant to the provisions of the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943. The question is whether petitioner is entitled to deductions under section 23 (u) of the Internal Revenue Code for payments made to his wife in the taxable years under a separation agreement.

¶4Findings of Fact

¶5In the taxable years petitioner was, and still is, a resident of the State of New York. His tax returns for these years were filed with the collector for the third district of New York. Petitioner's former wife, Patricia Berman, is now a resident of the Dominion of Canada.

¶6The petitioner and Patricia Berman were married on April 14, 1934. On*8 or about August 18, 1941, they separated. Petitioner, who was and still is an attorney, after several conferences with his wife's attorneys entered into a separation agreement with his wife on September 25, 1941. Under the terms of the agreement, it was provided that it should be lawful for the petitioner and his wife to live separate and apart from each other at all times thereafter, free of restraint, interference, authority or control of the other as if each were sole and unmarried. Petitioner agreed, in full and complete satisfaction of his obligation to support and maintain his wife, to pay her $400 a month for the rest of her natural life, except upon certain conditions not here material.

¶7During the taxable years petitioner and his wife lived apart from each other in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and petitioner paid her sums totaling $5,200 in 1942 and $4,400 in 1943 for her separate maintenance and support. These payments were reported by Patricia Berman as her income, and she paid the tax thereon. In his returns for 1942 and 1943, petitioner claimed deductions for the payments, but they were disallowed by the respondent.

¶8Petitioner secured a final decree of*9 divorce from his wife on March 5, 1945, but prior thereto no decree of any court was ever secured or entered with respect to a separation or divorce between petitioner and his wife.

¶9On May 17, 1945, Patricia Berman executed an acceptance of a proposed overassessment of income tax for the taxable year ended December 31, 1943, in the sum of $1,083.70, which is dependent upon the outcome of this proceeding.

¶10Opinion

¶11ARUNDELL, Judge: The petitioner contends that he is entitled to deductions under section 23 (u)¹ of the Code for the payments which he made to his wife in 1942 and 1943, pursuant to their separation agreement. Deductions under section 23 (u), however, depend upon whether the amounts are includible in the wife's gross income under section 22 (k) ² of the Code.

¶12*10 Although the petitioner is now divorced, it is admitted that no decree of divorce or separate maintenance was ever entered by any court until after the taxable years. The question here is practically identical with that involved in Charles L. Brown, 7 T.C. 715, wherein we pointed out that under the statute a court decree is required, and that only payments "received subsequent to such decree" are deductible. All the payments here in question were made prior to any decree. Regardless of the fact that separation agreements between spouses may be entirely legal under state law, payments made thereunder do not qualify for deduction for Federal income tax purposes unless the agreement be incident to a judicial separation or divorce and unless the payments be made subsequent to the decree.

¶13On the authority of the Brown case, supra, we hold that the respondent did not err in disallowing the claimed deductions.

¶14Decision will be entered for the respondent.