6 Tex. Civ. App. 343 - Scott v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We are of opinion that after he received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceedings provided for in Art. 226. This record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford ‘proof of a conviction of any felony.’ Having been thus canceled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace has received. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 344 ; Knote v. U. S., 95 Ú. S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191 . Cases may be found holding that a pardon does not operate as a bar against a proceeding to strike an attorney from the rolls on account of the professional misconduct involved in the transaction which culminated in the conviction. Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140 ; In Re, an Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563 . In these cases the proceedings to disbar were not founded on statutes like ours, declaring the effect of a felony conviction, but upon facts showing professional misconduct. Where the proceeding, as in this case, depends alone upon the felony conviction, and that is wiped out by a pardon, the whole case falls.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 108 Tex. Crim. 467 - Sanders v. State