Fugo v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis
1994
Citation profile
Relationships
Applies 38 U.S.C. § 5107 · 38 U.S.C. § 7104 · 38 U.S.C. § 7251 · 38 U.S.C. § 7261 · 38 U.S.C. § 7266
Relies on Gilbert v. Derwinski · Murphy v. Derwinski · Russell v. Principi · EF v. Derwinski · Bethea v. Derwinski
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“If ... it is meant that there is a higher threshold for raising CUE in a BVA decision not subject to our review than there is for raising a garden variety error in a BVA decision subject to our review[,] then undoubtedly appellant is correct. There is, necessarily, a more stringent [pleading] requirement. In this respect the Fugo case conforms entirely to past precedent and merely makes explicit what those past cases perhaps implied. Pleading and proof are two sides of the same coin. If there is a heightened proof requirement, there is, a fortiori, a heightened pleading requirement. ... The Secretary’s own definition raises an extremely high threshold, clear and unmistakable, i.e., beyond any reasonable dispute. Moreover, it is a collateral attack on a final decision, thus the strong presumption of validity must be overcome. It would be strange, indeed, if there was not a more stringent requirement for the standard necessary to raise such a rare kind of error.... The \Fugo ] opinion is entirely consistent with past precedent.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Luallen v. Brown
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.