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6 Wis. 497

Stone v. Lannon

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1858

Wisconsin Supreme Court · decided 1858-07-01

This was an action on the case npon section 39, chapter 59, of the revised statutes, for the refusal to discharge a mortgage, after due demand and tender. Held: for the purpose of this action, as well as for other purposes. Sickles vs. Sharp, 13 J. R., 498; Smith’s Stat. and Const.

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Decided 1858-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently September 2014

10 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1JBy the Gouri,

Whiton, O. J.

¶2We are of opinion that the instructions of the judge to the jury were correct. We suppose there can be no doubt that the verbal agreement which Lannon made to execute the discharge of the mortgage would not bind him.

¶3But even if we should regard the agreement as binding upon him, and so capable of being the foundation of an action for damages, we should still be of opinion that this action could not be sustained. The action is brought upon a statute, to recover, what we must consider as a penalty; the statute, therefore, must receive a strict construction.

¶4It gives the penalty only in cases where the mortgagee or his personal representatives refuse to execute the discharge, “after a full performance of the condition of the,mortgage.” Now it cannot be said that the condition of this mortgage was fully performed, because the testimony shows that a further sum was to be paid by Dunn, the mortgagor.

¶5Lannon agreed to execute the discharge, but there does not appear to have been any consideration for this promise ; and as we have above stated, we do not consider it of force even as an agreement. But even if good as an agreement, it does not show that the condition of the mortgage had been fully performed as the statute requires.

¶6The plaintiff in error contends, that as Lannon agreed to execute the discharge, he is now estopped to say that the mortgage *502debt was not fully paid. We do not see how this position of the plaintiff in error can be sustained. If tiie plaintiff had been induced to purchase the land by the agreement of Lannon to discharge the mortgage, and Lannon had afterwards endeavored to enforce the mortgage by a foreclosure, perhaps the doctrine of estoppel would apply. But we see no reason for applying it in a case like the present. We think it unnecessary to notice the circumstance relied upon by the defendant in error, that a release of the mortgage was in fact executed by Lannon, and offered to Dunn and Cleary and refused by them.

¶7The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

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