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← 60 Md. App. 42 - Briscoe v. State

60 Md. App. 42 - Briscoe v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
2
states following
January 2016
most recently cited

2 district · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently January 2016

2 district · 6 state decisions

401984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Sandstrom v. Montana · Dorsey v. State · State v. Moon · 47 Md. App. 11 - Fouche v. Masters

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In the face of a timely objection, the trial judge read to the jury § 10-307, including subsection (e) which provides If at the time of testing there was in the person’s blood 0.13 percent or more by weight of alcohol, as determined by an analysis of the person’s blood or breath, it shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant was intoxicated. This instruction, which the State concedes should not have been given, plainly told the jury that they could indulge in a prima facie inference that Briscoe was intoxicated. The statutory “prima facie evidence” language is, of course, addressed to the trial judge. It tells him, in effect, that if certain evidence has been introduced (after compliance with the statutory preconditions) there is a case sufficient to go to the jury — a case in which the jury may but is not required to find intoxication. In the case before us, we cannot hold that the “prima facie evidence” instruction was not prejudicial so far as the driving while intoxicated charge is concerned. Use of the “prima facie evidence” wording of § 10-307(e) might have incorrectly persuaded the jury that this was a statutory presumption, thus requiring Briscoe to rebut it.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.