60 N.C. App. 604 - State v. Sanderson’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 24 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently June 2010 · most notably 69 N.C. App. 38 - State v. Rozier (1984), 71 N.C. App. 521 - State v. Baize (1984)
3 federal appellate · 24 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Blockburger v. United States · Delli Paoli v. United States · State v. Silhan · State v. McKinney · Stevenson v. City of Durham
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Manufacturing or possession under G.S. 90-95(a) does not require proof of any additional facts beyond those required under G.S. 90-95(h)(l), therefore convictions under both statutes violate defendants’ protection against double jeopardy, and the convictions for the lesser included offenses should be vacated.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Although the doctrine of stare decisis leads us to follow the Anderson decision, for the following'reasons we would reach a different result if we were addressing this question for the first time. In seeking to discover the legislative intent for interpretation of a statute, the court should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish. Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300 , 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972). It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that words of a statute will ordinarily be given their natural, approved, and recognized meaning. Victory Cab Co. v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572 , 68 S.E.2d 433 (1951). The words "shall be guilty of a felony which felony shall be known as 'trafficking in marijuana’ ’’ seems to mean if a person does the forbidden act(s), he shall be guilty of one felony: trafficking in marijuana. Otherwise, the statute should read: "Any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or possesses in excess of 50 pounds shall be guilty of trafficking in marijuana.” If the legislature intended G.S. 90 — 95(h)(1) to be interpreted in the same way as G.S. 90-95(a), they could easily have followed the language of G.S. 90-95(a): "It is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, deliver, transport or possess a controlled substance in excess of 50 pounds.” Or, they could have simply increased the penalties provided in G.S. 90-95(b) for violations with large quantities of marijuana, and not ”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Sanderson v. Rice“It is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, deliver, transport or possess a controlled substance in excess of 50 pounds.” Or, they could have simply increased the penalties provided in G.S. 90-95(b) for violations with large quantities of marijuana, and not included section (h) at all. Since they chose language which indicates that the offenses constitute one felony, logically the statute seems to refer to only one felony. Any other result implies the words”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Sanderson v. Rice
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.